驳唯心论

简介

The essay appeared in Mind in 1903, the year of Principia Ethica, when British philosophy was dominated by idealists such as F. H. Bradley. Moore does not set out to prove that material things exist; he attacks a premise he finds in idealist arguments, Berkeley’s principle that to be is to be perceived. In every sensation, he argues, the act of consciousness must be distinguished from its object – the sensation of blue from blue itself. Consciousness is “diaphanous”: when we try to attend to it, we see only the blue. So the object of an experience can exist without being experienced. With Russell’s work of the same years, the essay is regarded as a starting point of analytic philosophy.

联系

批评了

• 人类知识原理1710 · 乔治·贝克莱

G. E. 摩尔 的更多作品

• 1903伦理学原理
• 1925为常识辩护