作品 · 分析哲学
有意识的心灵
难问题与僵尸论证。
简介
Chalmers’s first book, published by Oxford University Press in 1996, develops the “hard problem” of consciousness he had presented at a conference in Tucson in 1994 and in a paper of 1995: why are physical processes accompanied by experience at all? The “easy” problems concern functions such as attention or the reporting of mental states. Chalmers argues that zombies – beings physically identical to us but without experience – are conceivable, so consciousness does not follow logically from the physical facts. He defends a “naturalistic dualism” in which experience is a basic feature of the world, tied to physical processes by psychophysical laws, and takes panpsychism seriously. The term “hard problem” has since become standard.
联系
承接了
- 命名与必然性1972 · 索尔·克里普克
- 成为一只蝙蝠是什么样子?1974 · 托马斯·内格尔
批评了
- 意识的解释1991 · 丹尼尔·丹尼特
出现在
- 旅程 ‘意识之谜’ · 第 10 站,共 10 站
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