डेविड चाल्मर्स
मस्तिष्क क्या करता है इसका पूरा वृत्तांत भी यह नहीं समझाएगा कि उसमें से कुछ भी अनुभव क्यों होता है – यही चेतना की कठिन समस्या है।
पृष्ठभूमि
चेतना की “कठिन समस्या”: सूचना-प्रसंस्करण कुछ महसूस होने जैसा क्यों लगता है?
मुख्य विचार
- कठिन समस्या
- ज़ॉम्बी तर्क
- विस्तारित मन
प्रभाव
जिनसे प्रभावित 5
रने देकार्त
जिनसे प्रभावित
Chalmers revived a Cartesian conceivability argument – if zombies are conceivable, consciousness is not physical – for a dualism of properties rather than substances (The Conscious Mind, 1996). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); R. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641), sixth meditation; SEP “Zombies”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
रने देकार्त › 1596–1650
बर्टराण्ड रसेल
जिनसे प्रभावित ✓
Chalmers took up Russell’s view that physics reveals only structure, leaving intrinsic natures that may ground consciousness, as ‘Russellian monism’ (‘Consciousness and its Place in Nature’, 2002). D. J. Chalmers, “Consciousness and its Place in Nature” (2002); “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism”, Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 8 (2013); B. Russell, The Analysis of Matter (1927); SEP “Russellian Monism”
साक्ष्य: Wikidata में भी · Wikidata
बर्टराण्ड रसेल › 1872–1970
थॉमस नागेल
जिनसे प्रभावित
Chalmers defined consciousness with Nagel’s phrase that there is ‘something it is like’ to be a subject and made explaining it the ‘hard problem’ (1995). D. J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1995); The Conscious Mind (1996); T. Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, Philosophical Review 83 (1974)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
थॉमस नागेल › जन्म 1937
शॉल क्रिपके
जिनसे प्रभावित
Chalmers took up Kripke’s modal argument against mind–brain identity and explained a posteriori necessities like ‘water is H₂O’ with two-dimensional semantics (The Conscious Mind, 1996). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1980); SEP “Zombies”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
शॉल क्रिपके › 1940–2022
फ़्रैंक जैक्सन
जिनसे प्रभावित
Chalmers used Jackson’s knowledge argument about Mary against materialism (The Conscious Mind, 1996) and defended with Jackson the a priori entailment of macroscopic truths by physical ones (2001). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); D. J. Chalmers and F. Jackson, “Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation”, Philosophical Review 110 (2001); F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); SEP “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
फ़्रैंक जैक्सन › जन्म 1943
आलोचना
जिनकी आलोचना की 2
जॉन सर्ल
जिनकी आलोचना की
Chalmers rejected Searle’s Chinese Room argument: by the principle of organisational invariance, a system with the right functional organisation would be conscious (The Conscious Mind, 1996, ch. 9). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996), chs. 7, 9; J. R. Searle, “Consciousness and the Philosophers”, New York Review of Books, 6 March 1997, and the ensuing exchange
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
जॉन सर्ल › 1932–2025
डैनियल डेनेट
जिनकी आलोचना की
Chalmers argued that Dennett’s functional account of consciousness addresses only the ‘easy problems’ and denies the explanandum, experience itself (‘Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness’, 1995). D. J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1995); The Conscious Mind (1996); reply: D. C. Dennett, “Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness”, JCS 3 (1996)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
डैनियल डेनेट › 1942–2024
कृतियाँ
- 1996चेतन मन
कठिन समस्या और ज़ॉम्बी तर्क।
मत
Chalmers distinguished the “easy problems” of consciousness – explaining how the brain discriminates stimuli, integrates information and controls behaviour – from the “hard problem”: why all this processing is accompanied by subjective experience at all. His zombie argument runs: a being physically identical to us but without experience is conceivable; what is conceivable in this way is possible; so the physical facts do not fix the facts about consciousness, and physicalism is false. Chalmers therefore defends a naturalistic dualism and takes panpsychist ideas seriously. Critics mostly attack the step from conceivability to possibility. With Andy Clark he also proposed the thesis of the “extended mind”: notebooks or smartphones can, under certain conditions, be part of our mind. In Reality+ he argued that virtual worlds are genuine realities.
जीवन और संदर्भ
Chalmers was born in Sydney in 1966 and studied mathematics in Adelaide and at Oxford before taking his doctorate in philosophy and cognitive science under Douglas Hofstadter at Indiana University. He taught at the Australian National University and New York University, where he co-directs the Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness. His talk on the “hard problem” at the first Tucson conference on consciousness in 1994 made his name beyond philosophy.
अन्य प्रमुख कृतियाँ
- Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (1995)
- The Conscious Mind (1996)
- The Extended Mind (with Andy Clark, 1998)
- Constructing the World (2012)
- Reality+ (2022)
इनमें आता है
- यात्रा ‘चेतना की पहेली’ · 10 में से पड़ाव 10
- बहस ‘क्या मशीनें सोच या अनुभव कर सकती हैं?’
- बहस ‘क्या मशीनों के अधिकार होने चाहिए?’
- बहस ‘चेतना क्या है?’
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