David Chalmers

Agora

David Chalmers

b. 1966

A first way ina deliberate simplification – the portrait says more

Even a full account of what the brain does would not explain why any of it is experienced – that is the hard problem of consciousness.

Placement

Analytic Philosophy · Oceania · Mind & Consciousness

The “hard problem” of consciousness: why does information processing feel like something?

Key ideas

Hard problem
Zombie argument
Extended mind

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Influence

Influenced by 5

René Descartes

influenced by
Chalmers revived a Cartesian conceivability argument – if zombies are conceivable, consciousness is not physical – for a dualism of properties rather than substances (The Conscious Mind, 1996). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); R. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641), sixth meditation; SEP “Zombies”
Evidence: AI draft
René Descartes › 1596–1650
Bertrand Russell

influenced by ✓
Chalmers took up Russell’s view that physics reveals only structure, leaving intrinsic natures that may ground consciousness, as ‘Russellian monism’ (‘Consciousness and its Place in Nature’, 2002). D. J. Chalmers, “Consciousness and its Place in Nature” (2002); “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism”, Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 8 (2013); B. Russell, The Analysis of Matter (1927); SEP “Russellian Monism”
Evidence: also in Wikidata · Wikidata
Bertrand Russell › 1872–1970
Thomas Nagel

influenced by
Chalmers defined consciousness with Nagel’s phrase that there is ‘something it is like’ to be a subject and made explaining it the ‘hard problem’ (1995). D. J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1995); The Conscious Mind (1996); T. Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, Philosophical Review 83 (1974)
Evidence: AI draft
Thomas Nagel › b. 1937
Saul Kripke

influenced by
Chalmers took up Kripke’s modal argument against mind–brain identity and explained a posteriori necessities like ‘water is H₂O’ with two-dimensional semantics (The Conscious Mind, 1996). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1980); SEP “Zombies”
Evidence: AI draft
Saul Kripke › 1940–2022
Frank Jackson

influenced by
Chalmers used Jackson’s knowledge argument about Mary against materialism (The Conscious Mind, 1996) and defended with Jackson the a priori entailment of macroscopic truths by physical ones (2001). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); D. J. Chalmers and F. Jackson, “Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation”, Philosophical Review 110 (2001); F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); SEP “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument”
Evidence: AI draft
Frank Jackson › b. 1943

Criticism

Criticizes 2

John Searle

criticised
Chalmers rejected Searle’s Chinese Room argument: by the principle of organisational invariance, a system with the right functional organisation would be conscious (The Conscious Mind, 1996, ch. 9). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996), chs. 7, 9; J. R. Searle, “Consciousness and the Philosophers”, New York Review of Books, 6 March 1997, and the ensuing exchange
Evidence: AI draft
John Searle › 1932–2025
Daniel Dennett

criticised
Chalmers argued that Dennett’s functional account of consciousness addresses only the ‘easy problems’ and denies the explanandum, experience itself (‘Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness’, 1995). D. J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1995); The Conscious Mind (1996); reply: D. C. Dennett, “Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness”, JCS 3 (1996)
Evidence: AI draft
Daniel Dennett › 1942–2024

Works

1996The Conscious Mind
The hard problem and the zombie argument.

Position

Chalmers distinguished the “easy problems” of consciousness – explaining how the brain discriminates stimuli, integrates information and controls behaviour – from the “hard problem”: why all this processing is accompanied by subjective experience at all. His zombie argument runs: a being physically identical to us but without experience is conceivable; what is conceivable in this way is possible; so the physical facts do not fix the facts about consciousness, and physicalism is false. Chalmers therefore defends a naturalistic dualism and takes panpsychist ideas seriously. Critics mostly attack the step from conceivability to possibility. With Andy Clark he also proposed the thesis of the “extended mind”: notebooks or smartphones can, under certain conditions, be part of our mind. In Reality+ he argued that virtual worlds are genuine realities.

Life & context

Chalmers was born in Sydney in 1966 and studied mathematics in Adelaide and at Oxford before taking his doctorate in philosophy and cognitive science under Douglas Hofstadter at Indiana University. He taught at the Australian National University and New York University, where he co-directs the Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness. His talk on the “hard problem” at the first Tucson conference on consciousness in 1994 made his name beyond philosophy.