Dai Zhen
Mowę o wyższej zasadzie wykorzystywano do tłamszenia zwykłych pragnień – ale prawdziwa moralność to właściwe uporządkowanie uczuć i potrzeb, jakie mają wszyscy.
Umiejscowienie
Filolog qingowskiej „nauki opartej na dowodach”: neokonfucjańską „zasadę” wykorzystywano do tłumienia ludzkich pragnień – prawdziwa zasada to stosowny ład w uczuciach i pragnieniach.
Kluczowe idee
- Zasada w pragnieniach
- Badania oparte na dowodach (kaozheng)
- Krytyka neokonfucjańskiego li
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 1
Mencjusz
pod wpływem
Dai Zhen’s Evidential Study of the Meaning of Terms in the Mencius (1777) recovered Mencius’ terms philologically to show that principle lies within feelings and desires. Dai Zhen, Mengzi ziyi shuzheng (1777), tr. A. Chin & M. Freeman, Tai Chen on Mencius (1990)
Źródło: szkic AI
Mencjusz › ok. 372–289 p.n.e.
Wpływ na 1
Hu Shi
wpływ na
In The Philosophy of Dai Zhen (1927) Hu Shih presented Dai Zhen’s evidential method and his defence of human desires as a native forerunner of scientific thinking. Hu Shi, Dai Dongyuan de zhexue (1927); A. Chin & M. Freeman, Tai Chen on Mencius (1990)
Źródło: szkic AI
Hu Shi › 1891–1962
Krytyka
Krytykuje 2
Cheng Yi
krytykuje
Dai Zhen charged that the Cheng–Zhu principle (li), set apart from human desires, had let the powerful put people to death in the name of principle (Mengzi ziyi shuzheng, 1777). Dai Zhen, Mengzi ziyi shuzheng (1777), tr. A. Chin & M. Freeman, Tai Chen on Mencius, 1990
Źródło: szkic AI
Cheng Yi › 1033–1107
Zhu Xi
krytykuje
Dai Zhen rejected Zhu Xi’s principle as something bestowed by Heaven and residing in the mind: principle is the order within things and desires, found by study (1777). Dai Zhen, Mengzi ziyi shuzheng (1777), tr. A. Chin & M. Freeman, Tai Chen on Mencius, 1990
Źródło: szkic AI
Zhu Xi › 1130–1200
Dzieła
Przez dokładne znaczenie kluczowych terminów u Mencjusza Dai Zhen dowodzi, że neokonfucjańska „zasada” jest importem o buddyjskim zabarwieniu, który tłamsi ludzkie uczucia.
Stanowisko
Dai Zhen was the leading philosopher of Qing evidential research (kaozheng), which sought the meaning of the classics through exact philology. From the original meaning of key terms in Mencius he argued that Cheng–Zhu Neo-Confucianism had imported a Buddhist and Daoist notion of principle as a thing received from Heaven and lodged in the mind. True principle is the unerring pattern within feelings and desires, found by putting oneself in others’ place. Turned against desire, principle lets the strong condemn the weak: those who die by law are pitied, he wrote, but who pities those who die by principle? His ethics was revived by Liang Qichao and Hu Shih.
Życie i kontekst
Dai Zhen was born in 1724 in Xiuning (Anhui), the son of a cloth merchant, and studied with the scholar Jiang Yong. From the 1750s he was famous in Beijing for work on phonology, mathematics, astronomy and geography, though he repeatedly failed the highest examination. He worked on the imperial Complete Library of the Four Treasuries from 1773 and died in Beijing in 1777.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- On the Origin of Goodness (Yuan shan, 1760s)
- Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Mengzi (Mengzi ziyi shuzheng, 1777)
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