Frank Jackson
Naukowczyni, która zna każdy fakt fizyczny o barwie, i tak dowiaduje się czegoś nowego, gdy po raz pierwszy widzi czerwień – tak przynajmniej twierdził, zanim zmienił zdanie.
Umiejscowienie
Australijski filozof: Mary, badaczka barw, która widziała dotąd tylko czerń i biel, dowiaduje się czegoś nowego, gdy po raz pierwszy widzi czerwień – więc wiedza fizyczna nie jest całą wiedzą (1982). Sam później odrzucił ten argument.
Kluczowe idee
- Argument z wiedzy (pokój Mary)
- Epifenomenalne qualia
- Analiza pojęciowa („plan Canberry”)
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 1
J.J.C. Smart
pod wpływem
Jackson worked within the Australian materialism shaped by Smart: after the knowledge argument (1982) he returned to a physicalism defended by conceptual analysis (From Metaphysics to Ethics, 1998). F. Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (1998); “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959); SEP “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument”
Źródło: szkic AI
J.J.C. Smart › 1920–2012
Wpływ na 1
David Chalmers
wpływ na
Chalmers used Jackson’s knowledge argument about Mary against materialism (The Conscious Mind, 1996) and defended with Jackson the a priori entailment of macroscopic truths by physical ones (2001). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); D. J. Chalmers and F. Jackson, “Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation”, Philosophical Review 110 (2001); F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); SEP “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument”
Źródło: szkic AI
David Chalmers › ur. 1966
Krytyka
Krytyka ze strony 2
David Lewis
krytyka ze strony
Lewis answered Jackson’s knowledge argument with the ability hypothesis: on seeing red, Mary gains abilities to recognise, imagine and remember, not new information (‘What Experience Teaches’, 1988). D. Lewis, “What Experience Teaches”, Proceedings of the Russellian Society 13 (1988); F. Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know”, Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986)
Źródło: szkic AI
David Lewis › 1941–2001
Daniel Dennett
krytyka ze strony
Dennett argued that Jackson’s Mary, knowing all physical facts, would learn nothing on seeing colour and would spot a blue-painted banana as a trick (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 12; F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); Jackson later gave up the argument (“Postscript on Qualia”, 1998)
Źródło: szkic AI
Daniel Dennett › 1942–2024
Dzieła
Pokój Mary: pełna wiedza fizyczna o widzeniu barw nie jest wiedzą o tym, jak to jest widzieć czerwień.
Wykłady Johna Locke’a z 1995 roku: analiza pojęciowa mówi nam, gdzie w świecie fizycznym umieścić barwę, umysł i wartość.
Stanowisko
“Epiphenomenal Qualia” (1982) contains one of the best-known thought experiments in the philosophy of mind. Mary is a brilliant scientist who has spent her life in a black-and-white room and has learned everything physical there is to know about colour and colour vision. When she leaves the room and sees a ripe tomato, she seems to learn something new: what it is like to see red. If so, not all knowledge is physical knowledge, and physicalism is false. Jackson took the further step of accepting that such “qualia” have no physical effects. He distinguished his argument from Nagel’s question of what it is like to be a bat, which concerns another point of view rather than complete physical knowledge. Replies became a literature of their own: Lewis argued that Mary gains abilities, not information; Dennett denied that she would be surprised; Chalmers built on the argument against physicalism. From the late 1990s Jackson himself became a physicalist and argued that the intuition that Mary learns a new fact is mistaken. In From Metaphysics to Ethics (1998) he defended conceptual analysis as the way to locate colour, mind and value in a physical world, a method later called the “Canberra plan”. He has also written on perception, conditionals and consequentialism.
Życie i kontekst
Frank Cameron Jackson was born in Melbourne in 1943. Both his parents taught philosophy; his father, Allan Cameron Jackson, had studied with Wittgenstein in Cambridge. He studied mathematics and philosophy at the University of Melbourne and took his doctorate at La Trobe University. After posts at Adelaide and La Trobe he succeeded his father in the chair of philosophy at Monash University in 1978. From 1986 he worked at the Australian National University in Canberra, and from 2007 to 2014 he was a regular visiting professor at Princeton. He gave the John Locke Lectures at Oxford in 1995 and was made an Officer of the Order of Australia in 2006.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- Perception: A Representative Theory (1977)
- What Mary Didn’t Know (1986)
- Conditionals (1987)
- Language, Names, and Information (2010)
Pojawia się w
- Debata „Czym jest świadomość?”
Stan na listopad 2026 · Źródła · Ulepsz tę stronę · Jak powstaje Agora