P. F. Strawson

Agora

P. F. Strawson

1919–2006

A first way ina deliberate simplification – the portrait says more

If there is no King of France, saying “the King of France is bald” is not false but misfires – and our practice of blaming and resenting needs no metaphysical backing.

Placement

Analytic Philosophy · Northern Europe · Language, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ethics

Oxford philosopher: against Russell, “The present King of France is bald” presupposes rather than asserts that there is a king; a “descriptive metaphysics” of bodies and persons; responsibility grounded in reactive attitudes such as resentment.

Key ideas

Presupposition (“On Referring”)
Descriptive metaphysics
Persons as basic particulars
Reactive attitudes

Teachers: H. P. Grice

Students: John Searle

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Influence

Influenced by 3

David Hume

influenced by
Strawson took from Hume a naturalist answer to scepticism: belief in bodies and induction are inescapable natural commitments that neither need nor admit justification (Skepticism and Naturalism, 1985). P. F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (1985); SEP “Peter Frederick Strawson”
Evidence: AI draft
David Hume › 1711–1776
Immanuel Kant

influenced by
Strawson reconstructed the analytic core of Kant’s Critique – the conditions of any experience intelligible to us – while rejecting transcendental idealism (The Bounds of Sense, 1966). P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (1966); Individuals (1959); SEP “Peter Frederick Strawson”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Immanuel Kant › 1724–1804
H. P. Grice studied with

studied with
Grice was one of Strawson’s two philosophy tutors, with J. D. Mabbott, when Strawson read PPE at St John’s College, Oxford (1937–40); they later wrote ‘In Defense of a Dogma’ (1956) together. SEP “Peter Frederick Strawson”; P. F. Strawson, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson (1998)
Evidence: AI draft
H. P. Grice › 1913–1988

Influenced 1

John Searle taught

taught
Strawson was Searle’s tutor at Oxford; Searle credited him without hesitation with having truly taught him how to do philosophy, recalled tutorials for which his essay was due a day in advance, and the two became close friends. J. R. Searle, interview with T. Crane, CRASSH, University of Cambridge (9 June 2014)
Evidence: AI draft
John Searle › 1932–2025

Criticism

Criticizes 2

Bertrand Russell

criticised
Strawson objected that Russell’s theory of descriptions confuses sentences with uses: ‘The King of France is bald’ presupposes, not asserts, that a king exists (‘On Referring’, 1950). P. F. Strawson, “On Referring”, Mind 59 (1950), 320–344; Russell’s reply: “Mr. Strawson on Referring”, Mind 66 (1957)
Evidence: AI draft
Bertrand Russell › 1872–1970
W. V. O. Quine

criticised
In ‘In Defense of a Dogma’ (1956), written with Grice, Strawson argued that Quine’s doubts about analyticity would make the notions of synonymy and meaning itself unintelligible. H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson, “In Defense of a Dogma”, Philosophical Review 65 (1956); P. F. Strawson, “Propositions, Concepts and Logical Truths”, Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1957)
Evidence: AI draft
W. V. O. Quine › 1908–2000

Works

1950On Referring
Against Russell’s theory of descriptions: if there is no King of France, “The King of France is bald” is neither true nor false.
1959Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics
Describes rather than revises the structure of our thought: material bodies and persons are the basic particulars.

Position

“On Referring” (1950) challenged Russell’s theory of descriptions. Russell had analysed “The King of France is bald” as asserting that there is exactly one king of France and that he is bald, which makes the sentence false. Strawson replied that sentences do not refer – people use them to refer – and that the use of the sentence presupposes that there is a king; if there is none, the question of truth or falsity does not arise. Introduction to Logical Theory (1952) argued that the logical constants do not match the words of ordinary language, a view Grice later answered with his theory of implicature. In Individuals (1959) Strawson contrasted the “revisionary metaphysics” of Descartes or Leibniz with a “descriptive metaphysics” that lays bare the actual structure of our thought, as Aristotle and Kant had done. For us material bodies and persons are the basic particulars, and a person is not a mind attached to a body but something to which both mental and physical predicates apply. The Bounds of Sense (1966) reconstructed Kant’s Critique without transcendental idealism. “Freedom and Resentment” (1962) shifted the debate on free will: our practices of resentment, gratitude and blame are part of human life and need no metaphysical justification.

Life & context

Peter Frederick Strawson was born in Ealing, London, in 1919 and studied philosophy, politics and economics at St John’s College, Oxford, where H. P. Grice was his tutor. He served in the Royal Artillery and the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers from 1940 to 1946, leaving as a captain. After a year at Bangor he became a fellow of University College, Oxford, in 1948, and from 1968 to 1987 was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College. He was knighted in 1977. Among those he supervised was John Searle; his son Galen Strawson is also a philosopher. He died in London in 2006.