U. T. Place

Agora

U. T. Place

1924–2000

Pierwsze przybliżeniecelowe uproszczenie – portret mówi więcej

Świadomość może okazać się procesem mózgowym, tak jak błyskawica okazała się elektrycznością – rozstrzyga nauka, a nie znaczenia słów.

Umiejscowienie

Filozofia analityczna · Europa Północna · Umysł i świadomość, Nauka

Brytyjski filozof i psycholog: „Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” (1956) dowodził, że świadomość może być procesem mózgowym w tym samym sensie, w jakim błyskawica jest wyładowaniem elektrycznym – tożsamością odkrywaną przez naukę, a nie przez analizę znaczeń.

Kluczowe idee

Teoria tożsamości umysłu
„Błąd fenomenologiczny”
Obrona behawioryzmu w odniesieniu do dyspozycji

Otwórz na mapie gwiazd

Wpływ

Wpływ na 1

J.J.C. Smart

wpływ na
Convinced by his Adelaide colleague Place, Smart defended the identity of sensations and brain processes and answered objections to Place’s thesis (‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, 1959). J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); U. T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology 47 (1956); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
Źródło: szkic AI
J.J.C. Smart › 1920–2012

Krytyka

Krytykuje 1

Gilbert Ryle pod wpływem

pod wpływem
Place, who studied at Oxford under Ryle’s influence, started from Ryle’s treatment of attention and noticing in ‘The Concept of Heed’ (1954), the preliminary to his identity thesis. U. T. Place, “The Concept of Heed”, British Journal of Psychology 45 (1954); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
Źródło: szkic AI
krytykuje
Place accepted Ryle’s dispositional analysis of belief and intelligence but held that consciousness and sensations are inner brain processes (‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’, 1956). U. T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology 47 (1956), 44–50
Źródło: szkic AI
Gilbert Ryle › 1900–1976

Dzieła

1956Is Consciousness a Brain Process? (Czy świadomość jest procesem mózgowym?)
Teza, że świadomość jest procesem mózgowym, jest rozsądną hipotezą naukową, której nie wolno odrzucać z powodów logicznych.

Stanowisko

Place accepted much of Ryle’s behaviourism: beliefs, knowledge and intelligence are dispositions to behave. But in “The Concept of Heed” (1954) he argued that consciousness, sensation and mental imagery cannot be analysed in this way. “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” (1956) proposed instead that they are processes in the brain. The claim is not that “consciousness” means “brain process” – plainly it does not – but that the two may turn out to be the same thing, as a cloud turns out to be a mass of water droplets or lightning a motion of electric charges. Such an identity is a scientific hypothesis and cannot be ruled out by logic. Place also named the “phenomenological fallacy”: the mistake of supposing that when we describe our experience as green, there must be something green inside us, rather than describing it by reference to how things look in normal conditions. His paper, together with Herbert Feigl’s and Smart’s, started the mind–brain identity theory. In later life he defended B. F. Skinner’s radical behaviourism against Noam Chomsky.

Życie i kontekst

Ullin Thomas Place was born in 1924 in Northallerton, Yorkshire, and educated at Rugby School. He won a scholarship to Corpus Christi College, Oxford, in 1942, but as a conscientious objector worked in the Friends’ Ambulance Unit from 1943 to 1946. He graduated in philosophy and psychology in 1949, strongly influenced by Gilbert Ryle, and took a diploma in anthropology. From 1951 he lectured in psychology at the University of Adelaide, where the philosophy department was headed by J. J. C. Smart. He left Adelaide at the beginning of 1955, worked for many years as a clinical psychologist in Britain and later taught philosophy and psychology, mainly at the University of Leeds. He died in Thirsk in 2000 and left his brain to the University of Adelaide.