Agoraविचारों का एक खुला चौक

फ़्रैंक जैक्सन

जन्म 1943

पहली झलकजानबूझकर सरलीकृत – परिचय में और विस्तार है

रंग के बारे में हर भौतिक तथ्य जानने वाली एक वैज्ञानिक जब पहली बार लाल देखती है तब भी कुछ नया सीखती है – या ऐसा उन्होंने तर्क दिया, अपना मत बदलने से पहले।

पृष्ठभूमि

विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन · ओशिनिया · मन और चेतना, तत्त्वमीमांसा

ऑस्ट्रेलियाई दार्शनिक: मैरी, रंगों की एक वैज्ञानिक जिसने केवल श्वेत-श्याम देखा है, लाल को पहली बार देखकर कुछ नया सीखती है – इसलिए भौतिक ज्ञान सारा ज्ञान नहीं है (1982)। बाद में उन्होंने स्वयं इस तर्क को अस्वीकार कर दिया।

मुख्य विचार

  • ज्ञान-तर्क (मैरी का कमरा)
  • उपघटनावादी क्वालिया
  • अवधारणात्मक विश्लेषण (“कैनबरा योजना”)

तारा-मानचित्र में खोलें

प्रभाव

जिनसे प्रभावित 1

  • जे. जे. सी. स्मार्ट

    जिनसे प्रभावित

    Jackson worked within the Australian materialism shaped by Smart: after the knowledge argument (1982) he returned to a physicalism defended by conceptual analysis (From Metaphysics to Ethics, 1998). F. Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (1998); “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959); SEP “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument”

    साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा

    जे. जे. सी. स्मार्ट › 1920–2012

जिन्हें प्रभावित किया 1

  • डेविड चाल्मर्स

    जिन्हें प्रभावित किया

    Chalmers used Jackson’s knowledge argument about Mary against materialism (The Conscious Mind, 1996) and defended with Jackson the a priori entailment of macroscopic truths by physical ones (2001). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); D. J. Chalmers and F. Jackson, “Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation”, Philosophical Review 110 (2001); F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); SEP “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument”

    साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा

    डेविड चाल्मर्स › जन्म 1966

आलोचना

जिनके द्वारा आलोचित 2

  • डेविड लेविस

    जिनके द्वारा आलोचित

    Lewis answered Jackson’s knowledge argument with the ability hypothesis: on seeing red, Mary gains abilities to recognise, imagine and remember, not new information (‘What Experience Teaches’, 1988). D. Lewis, “What Experience Teaches”, Proceedings of the Russellian Society 13 (1988); F. Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know”, Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986)

    साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा

    डेविड लेविस › 1941–2001

  • डैनियल डेनेट

    जिनके द्वारा आलोचित

    Dennett argued that Jackson’s Mary, knowing all physical facts, would learn nothing on seeing colour and would spot a blue-painted banana as a trick (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 12; F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); Jackson later gave up the argument (“Postscript on Qualia”, 1998)

    साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा

    डैनियल डेनेट › 1942–2024

कृतियाँ

मत

“Epiphenomenal Qualia” (1982) contains one of the best-known thought experiments in the philosophy of mind. Mary is a brilliant scientist who has spent her life in a black-and-white room and has learned everything physical there is to know about colour and colour vision. When she leaves the room and sees a ripe tomato, she seems to learn something new: what it is like to see red. If so, not all knowledge is physical knowledge, and physicalism is false. Jackson took the further step of accepting that such “qualia” have no physical effects. He distinguished his argument from Nagel’s question of what it is like to be a bat, which concerns another point of view rather than complete physical knowledge. Replies became a literature of their own: Lewis argued that Mary gains abilities, not information; Dennett denied that she would be surprised; Chalmers built on the argument against physicalism. From the late 1990s Jackson himself became a physicalist and argued that the intuition that Mary learns a new fact is mistaken. In From Metaphysics to Ethics (1998) he defended conceptual analysis as the way to locate colour, mind and value in a physical world, a method later called the “Canberra plan”. He has also written on perception, conditionals and consequentialism.

जीवन और संदर्भ

Frank Cameron Jackson was born in Melbourne in 1943. Both his parents taught philosophy; his father, Allan Cameron Jackson, had studied with Wittgenstein in Cambridge. He studied mathematics and philosophy at the University of Melbourne and took his doctorate at La Trobe University. After posts at Adelaide and La Trobe he succeeded his father in the chair of philosophy at Monash University in 1978. From 1986 he worked at the Australian National University in Canberra, and from 2007 to 2014 he was a regular visiting professor at Princeton. He gave the John Locke Lectures at Oxford in 1995 and was made an Officer of the Order of Australia in 2006.

अन्य प्रमुख कृतियाँ

  • Perception: A Representative Theory (1977)
  • Epiphenomenal Qualia (1982)
  • What Mary Didn’t Know (1986)
  • Conditionals (1987)
  • From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (1998)
  • Language, Names, and Information (2010)

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