دانز سكوطس
الوجود يعني الشيء نفسه سواء قيل عن الله أو عن المخلوقات، ولكل فرد «هذيّته» الفريدة (haecceitas)، والإرادة تعلو على العقل.
التموضع
«المعلّم الدقيق» (Doctor subtilis): أحادية معنى الوجود و«الهذيّة» (haecceitas) التي تميّز الفرد.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- أحادية معنى الوجود
- الهذيّة (Haecceitas)
- أولوية الإرادة
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 3
أرسطو
تأثّر بـ
Scotus took up Aristotle’s science of being as being and, siding with Avicenna, held that being is its subject and is said univocally of God and creatures. Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum I q. 1; Ordinatio I d. 3 p. 1 qq. 1–3; SEP “John Duns Scotus”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
أرسطو › 384–322 ق.م
ابن سينا
تأثّر بـ
Scotus took over Avicenna’s common nature, ‘horseness is just horseness’, indifferent to universality and singularity, and his view of being as the intellect’s first object. Avicenna, Metaphysics (al-Ilāhiyyāt) V.1; Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II d. 3 p. 1 q. 1; I d. 3; SEP “John Duns Scotus”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ابن سينا › 980–1037
أنسلم من كانتربري
تأثّر بـ
Scotus took over Anselm’s two affections of the will, for advantage and for justice, and ‘coloured’ his argument for God’s existence (Ordinatio I d. 2). Anselm, De casu diaboli; Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 2 p. 1 qq. 1–2; II d. 6 q. 2; SEP “John Duns Scotus”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
أنسلم من كانتربري › 1033–1109
أثّر في 4
فرنسيسكو سواريز
أثّر في
Suárez discussed Scotus at length in the Metaphysical Disputations (1597), drawing on Scotist intrinsic modes for his modal distinction while rejecting haecceity as principle of individuation. F. Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae (1597), disp. V–VII; SEP “Francisco Suárez”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
فرنسيسكو سواريز › 1548–1617
تشارلز ساندرز برس
أثّر في
Peirce called himself a Scotistic realist, defending against nominalism the reality of generals, and adapted Scotus’s haecceity, ‘thisness’, for his category of Secondness. J. F. Boler, Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism (1963); C. S. Peirce, review of Fraser’s Berkeley (1871); SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
تشارلز ساندرز برس › 1839–1914
مارتن هايدغر
أثّر في ✓
Heidegger’s habilitation thesis (1915; publ. 1916) treated Duns Scotus’s doctrine of categories and meaning; its main source, the Grammatica speculativa, was later shown to be Thomas of Erfurt’s. M. Heidegger, Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus (1916); T. Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1993); SEP “Martin Heidegger”; SEP “John Duns Scotus”
مارتن هايدغر › 1889–1976
جيل دولوز
أثّر في ✓
Deleuze took Duns Scotus’s univocity of being as the first moment of a philosophy of difference, followed by Spinoza and Nietzsche (Difference and Repetition, 1968). G. Deleuze, Différence et répétition (1968); Spinoza et le problème de l’expression (1968); SEP “Gilles Deleuze”; SEP “John Duns Scotus”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في Wikidata · Wikidata
جيل دولوز › 1925–1995
النقد
انتقده 1
وليم الأوكامي أثّر في
أثّر في ✓
Ockham took over Scotus’ distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition and his univocal concept of being, while rejecting common natures and the formal distinction. William of Ockham, Ordinatio, prologue q. 1; I d. 2; SEP “William of Ockham”
انتقده
Ockham rejected Scotus’ common natures and his formal distinction outside God: only individuals exist, and universals are concepts (Ordinatio I d. 2 q. 6). William of Ockham, Ordinatio I d. 2 qq. 1, 6; SEP “William of Ockham”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
وليم الأوكامي › نحو 1287–1347
ينتقد 1
توما الأكويني
انتقد
Duns Scotus rejected the Thomist view that matter individuates, positing a ‘thisness’ (haecceitas), and held ‘being’ univocal rather than analogical (Ordinatio II d. 3; I d. 3). John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II d. 3 p. 1; I d. 3 p. 1 qq. 1–3; SEP “John Duns Scotus”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
توما الأكويني › نحو 1225–1274
الأعمال
- نحو 1300أورديناتيو (Ordinatio)
شرح على «الجمل»: انصراف الوجود إلى معنى واحد (الاشتراك الأحادي) وأولوية الإرادة.
الموقف
Scotus held that “being” is said of God and creatures in one and the same sense – the univocity of being. Without this, he argued, we could form no real concept of God at all and natural theology would collapse. He also insisted on the full reality of the individual: what makes this thing this thing is a positive principle of its own, its “thisness” (haecceitas). Against an intellect-centred picture he stressed the freedom of the will, both in God and in humans. His subtle distinctions shaped the Franciscan school, provoked Ockham’s simplifications, and found later admirers from Peirce to Heidegger and Deleuze.
الحياة والسياق
Born around 1266 in Duns in southern Scotland, John Duns Scotus became a Franciscan and studied and taught at Oxford and Paris. In 1303 he briefly had to leave Paris for siding with the pope against King Philip IV. He was sent to Cologne in 1307 and died there the following year, leaving behind dense and often unfinished writings that earned him the name “Doctor subtilis”.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- Lectura (c. 1298)
- Reportatio Parisiensis (c. 1304)
- Treatise on the First Principle (c. 1305)
- Quodlibetal Questions (c. 1306)
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