जेरी फ़ोडर
चिंतन प्रतीकों की एक आंतरिक भाषा में संगणना है, और प्रत्यक्षण तथा भाषा विशेषीकृत, बहुत हद तक जन्मजात मॉड्यूलों पर चलते हैं।
पृष्ठभूमि
MIT और रटगर्स के संज्ञान-विज्ञान के दार्शनिक: चिंतन “चिंतन की भाषा” में मानसिक निरूपणों पर संगणना है; प्रत्यक्षण विशेषीकृत मॉड्यूलों पर चलता है।
मुख्य विचार
- चिंतन की भाषा
- मन का संगणनात्मक सिद्धांत
- मन की मॉड्यूलरता
- अवधारणाओं का जन्मजातवाद
गुरु: हिलरी पट्नम
प्रभाव
जिनसे प्रभावित 2
एलेन ट्यूरिंग
जिनसे प्रभावित
Fodor built his computational theory of mind on Turing’s model of computation: thinking is rule-governed manipulation of symbols in a language of thought (The Language of Thought, 1975). J. A. Fodor, The Language of Thought (1975); The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way (2000); SEP “The Computational Theory of Mind”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
एलेन ट्यूरिंग › 1912–1954
हिलरी पट्नम जिनसे पढ़ा
जिनसे पढ़ा
Fodor took his PhD at Princeton in 1960 under Putnam with a dissertation in the philosophy of language, The Uses of ‘Use’. Mathematics Genealogy Project, entry J. A. Fodor (Princeton 1960)
साक्ष्य: InPhO में भी · InPhO
हिलरी पट्नम › 1926–2016
आलोचना
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित 2
डैनियल डेनेट
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
Dennett objected to Fodor’s language of thought that ascribing beliefs does not require explicitly stored sentences in the head (‘A Cure for the Common Code?’, 1977). D. C. Dennett, “A Cure for the Common Code?”, Mind 86 (1977), repr. in Brainstorms (1978); The Intentional Stance (1987)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
डैनियल डेनेट › 1942–2024
एंडी क्लार्क
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
Clark defended connectionist models against Fodor and Pylyshyn’s claim that only a classical language of thought can explain the systematicity of cognition (Microcognition, 1989). A. Clark, Microcognition (1989); Associative Engines (1993); J. Fodor & Z. Pylyshyn, “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture”, Cognition 28 (1988)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
एंडी क्लार्क › जन्म 1957
जिनकी आलोचना की 3
चार्ल्स डार्विन
जिनकी आलोचना की
With Piattelli-Palmarini, Fodor argued that natural selection cannot distinguish traits selected for from coextensive ‘free riders’ and so does not explain adaptation (What Darwin Got Wrong, 2010). J. Fodor & M. Piattelli-Palmarini, What Darwin Got Wrong (2010), part II
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
चार्ल्स डार्विन › 1809–1882
लुडविग विट्गेंश्टाइन
जिनकी आलोचना की
With Chihara, Fodor attacked Wittgensteinian criteria for mental concepts (1965) and later argued that learning a language presupposes an innate language of thought (The Language of Thought, 1975). C. Chihara & J. Fodor, “Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein”, American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965); J. Fodor, The Language of Thought (1975), ch. 2
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
लुडविग विट्गेंश्टाइन › 1889–1951
गिल्बर्ट राइल
जिनकी आलोचना की
Against Ryle’s logical behaviourism Fodor argued that psychology must posit inner mental states that cause behaviour, not mere dispositions to behave (Psychological Explanation, 1968). J. Fodor, Psychological Explanation (1968); “The Mind–Body Problem”, Scientific American 244 (1981)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
गिल्बर्ट राइल › 1900–1976
कृतियाँ
- 1975चिंतन की भाषा
संज्ञानात्मक मनोविज्ञान निरूपण की एक आंतरिक प्रणाली को पूर्वमान्य करता है जिसका अपना वाक्य-विन्यास है – एक “मेंटलीज़” जिसमें चिंतन संगणना है।
- 1983मन की मॉड्यूलरता
प्रत्यक्षण और भाषा तेज़, आवृत्त निवेश-मॉड्यूलों द्वारा संभाले जाते हैं; इसके विपरीत केंद्रीय चिंतन समग्रवादी और समझाने में कठिन है।
मत
Fodor was the leading defender of the computational theory of mind. Against behaviourism, in Psychological Explanation (1968), and against Wittgensteinian views of mental concepts, in a 1965 paper with Charles Chihara, he argued that psychology must postulate inner mental states that cause behaviour. The Language of Thought (1975) claimed that these states are representations in an inner language with its own syntax and semantics – “mentalese” – and that thinking is the computation of such symbols. Only this, he argued, explains why thought is productive and systematic: whoever can think that John loves Mary can also think that Mary loves John. With Zenon Pylyshyn he used this argument in 1988 against connectionist models of the mind. The Modularity of Mind (1983) distinguished fast, encapsulated input systems for perception and language from central processes such as belief fixation, which are holistic and, he thought, beyond the reach of current cognitive science. He also held that most lexical concepts are innate and criticised semantic holism. His late book What Darwin Got Wrong (2010, with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini) argued that natural selection cannot explain why particular traits were selected; most biologists rejected it.
जीवन और संदर्भ
Jerry Fodor was born in New York City in 1935. He studied at Columbia University and took his doctorate at Princeton in 1960 under Hilary Putnam. From 1959 to 1986 he taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he worked closely with linguists and psychologists in the circle around Noam Chomsky. After two years at the City University of New York he moved in 1988 to Rutgers University, where he remained until his retirement in 2016. He wrote many essays and reviews for the London Review of Books. He died in New York in 2017.
अन्य प्रमुख कृतियाँ
- Psychological Explanation (1968)
- The Language of Thought (1975)
- The Modularity of Mind (1983)
- Psychosemantics (1987)
- Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (1998)
- The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way (2000)
- What Darwin Got Wrong (with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, 2010)
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