التسمية والضرورة

مقدمة

Three lectures that Kripke gave without a written text at Princeton in January 1970; transcribed, they appeared in 1972 in the anthology Semantics of Natural Language and in 1980 as a book with a new preface. Kripke argues against the description theory of Frege and Russell: a name is not an abbreviated description but refers directly, its reference fixed by an initial “baptism” and passed on through a causal chain of use. He separates necessity, a metaphysical notion, from a priori knowledge, an epistemological one: “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is necessary but was discovered empirically. The same reasoning applies to natural kinds such as water or gold. The lectures helped restore metaphysics to a central place in analytic philosophy.

الصلات

ينتقد

• الإحساس والمرجعية1892 · غوتلوب فريغه
• في الدلالة1905 · بيرتراند راسل

جرى تناوله في

• العقل الواعي (The Conscious Mind)1996 · ديفيد تشالمرز

انتُقد في

• في تعدد العوالم (On the Plurality of Worlds)1986 · ديفيد لويس

مزيد من أعمال شاول كريبك

• 1982فيتغنشتاين في القواعد واللغة الخاصة (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language)