Agora思想的公共广场

R. M. 黑尔

1919–2002

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

道德判断是规定，就像命令一样，必须同样适用于处于相同情境中的任何人——包括你自己。

定位

分析哲学 · 北欧 · 伦理学, 语言

普遍规定主义：道德判断是可普遍化的规定。

核心思想

  • 规定主义
  • 可普遍化

学生: 彼得·辛格

在星图中打开

影响

受影响于 2

  • 伊曼努尔·康德

    受其影响

    Hare built his universal prescriptivism on Kant’s universalizability and argued that Kant’s test leads to utilitarian results (Freedom and Reason, 1963; ‘Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?’, 1993). R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (1963); Moral Thinking (1981); “Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?”, Utilitas 5 (1993); SEP “Richard Mervyn Hare”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    伊曼努尔·康德 › 1724–1804

  • 约翰·斯图尔特·密尔

    受其影响

    Hare linked his two levels of moral thinking – intuitive everyday rules and critical utilitarian reasoning – to Mill’s secondary principles and first principle (Moral Thinking, 1981). R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (1981); J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (1861/63); SEP “Richard Mervyn Hare”

    依据: AI 草稿

    约翰·斯图尔特·密尔 › 1806–1873

影响了 1

  • 彼得·辛格 教过

    教过

    Singer’s Oxford BPhil thesis on civil disobedience (1971) was supervised by Hare and appeared as Democracy and Disobedience (1973); Singer’s later preference utilitarianism draws on Hare’s universal prescriptivism. P. Singer, “An Intellectual Autobiography”, in J. A. Schaler (ed.), Peter Singer Under Fire (2009); P. Singer, Democracy and Disobedience (1973)

    依据: AI 草稿

    彼得·辛格 › 1946年生

批评

受批评于 2

  • 艾丽丝·默多克

    受其批评

    Murdoch objected that Hare’s prescriptivism reduces morality to choice and universalisable rules, neglecting moral vision and the patient work of attention (The Sovereignty of Good, 1970). I. Murdoch, “Vision and Choice in Morality”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 30 (1956); The Sovereignty of Good (1970), “The Idea of Perfection”

    依据: AI 草稿

    艾丽丝·默多克 › 1919–1999

  • 菲利帕·富特

    受其批评

    Foot argued against Hare that not just anything can count as a moral reason: moral terms are tied to facts about human good and harm (‘Moral Beliefs’, 1958). P. Foot, “Moral Arguments”, Mind 67 (1958); “Moral Beliefs”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1958–59)

    依据: AI 草稿

    菲利帕·富特 › 1920–2010

批评了 1

  • A. J. 艾耶尔

    批评了

    Hare objected to emotivist theories like Ayer’s that they cannot tell moral reasoning from persuasion; moral judgements are universalisable prescriptions (The Language of Morals, 1952). R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (1952), ch. 1; Freedom and Reason (1963); A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936), ch. VI

    依据: AI 草稿

    A. J. 艾耶尔 › 1910–1989

作品

立场

Hare wanted to show that moral judgments, though not statements of fact, are nonetheless subject to rational argument. A moral “ought,” he argued, is a prescription – akin to an imperative – that tells us what to do. Unlike a mere command, it is universalisable: whoever judges that I ought to do something in a situation must judge the same for anyone in exactly similar circumstances, including himself on the receiving end. This logical requirement forces us to put ourselves in the position of all those affected. Hare’s universal prescriptivism thus led to a form of preference utilitarianism, which he developed in Moral Thinking. His student Peter Singer carried this approach into applied ethics.

生平与背景

Hare was born in Somerset in 1919. In the Second World War he was captured by the Japanese in Singapore and spent years as a prisoner of war, including forced labour on the Burma railway. He then taught at Oxford, from 1966 to 1983 as White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy, and later at the University of Florida.

其他主要作品

  • The Language of Morals (1952)
  • Freedom and Reason (1963)
  • Moral Thinking (1981)

来源: Wikipedia · Wikidata

截至 2026年11月 · 来源 · 改进本页 · Agora 是如何制作的

在星图中打开