R. M. Hare
Moral judgments are prescriptions, like commands, that must apply equally to anyone in the same situation – including yourself.
Placement
Universal prescriptivism: moral judgments are universalizable prescriptions.
Key ideas
- Prescriptivism
- Universalizability
Students: Peter Singer
Influence
Influenced by 2
Immanuel Kant
influenced by
Hare built his universal prescriptivism on Kant’s universalizability and argued that Kant’s test leads to utilitarian results (Freedom and Reason, 1963; ‘Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?’, 1993). R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (1963); Moral Thinking (1981); “Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?”, Utilitas 5 (1993); SEP “Richard Mervyn Hare”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Immanuel Kant › 1724–1804
John Stuart Mill
influenced by
Hare linked his two levels of moral thinking – intuitive everyday rules and critical utilitarian reasoning – to Mill’s secondary principles and first principle (Moral Thinking, 1981). R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (1981); J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (1861/63); SEP “Richard Mervyn Hare”
Evidence: AI draft
John Stuart Mill › 1806–1873
Influenced 1
Peter Singer taught
taught
Singer’s Oxford BPhil thesis on civil disobedience (1971) was supervised by Hare and appeared as Democracy and Disobedience (1973); Singer’s later preference utilitarianism draws on Hare’s universal prescriptivism. P. Singer, “An Intellectual Autobiography”, in J. A. Schaler (ed.), Peter Singer Under Fire (2009); P. Singer, Democracy and Disobedience (1973)
Evidence: AI draft
Peter Singer › b. 1946
Criticism
Criticized by 2
Iris Murdoch
criticised by
Murdoch objected that Hare’s prescriptivism reduces morality to choice and universalisable rules, neglecting moral vision and the patient work of attention (The Sovereignty of Good, 1970). I. Murdoch, “Vision and Choice in Morality”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 30 (1956); The Sovereignty of Good (1970), “The Idea of Perfection”
Evidence: AI draft
Iris Murdoch › 1919–1999
Philippa Foot
criticised by
Foot argued against Hare that not just anything can count as a moral reason: moral terms are tied to facts about human good and harm (‘Moral Beliefs’, 1958). P. Foot, “Moral Arguments”, Mind 67 (1958); “Moral Beliefs”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1958–59)
Evidence: AI draft
Philippa Foot › 1920–2010
Criticizes 1
A. J. Ayer
criticised
Hare objected to emotivist theories like Ayer’s that they cannot tell moral reasoning from persuasion; moral judgements are universalisable prescriptions (The Language of Morals, 1952). R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (1952), ch. 1; Freedom and Reason (1963); A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936), ch. VI
Evidence: AI draft
A. J. Ayer › 1910–1989
Works
Moral judgments as universalizable prescriptions.
Position
Hare wanted to show that moral judgments, though not statements of fact, are nonetheless subject to rational argument. A moral “ought,” he argued, is a prescription – akin to an imperative – that tells us what to do. Unlike a mere command, it is universalisable: whoever judges that I ought to do something in a situation must judge the same for anyone in exactly similar circumstances, including himself on the receiving end. This logical requirement forces us to put ourselves in the position of all those affected. Hare’s universal prescriptivism thus led to a form of preference utilitarianism, which he developed in Moral Thinking. His student Peter Singer carried this approach into applied ethics.
Life & context
Hare was born in Somerset in 1919. In the Second World War he was captured by the Japanese in Singapore and spent years as a prisoner of war, including forced labour on the Burma railway. He then taught at Oxford, from 1966 to 1983 as White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy, and later at the University of Florida.
Further main works
- Freedom and Reason (1963)
- Moral Thinking (1981)
As of November 2026 · Sources · Improve this page · How Agora is made