Richard Hare
Sądy moralne są nakazami, jak polecenia, które muszą stosować się jednakowo do każdego w tej samej sytuacji – także do ciebie samego.
Umiejscowienie
Uniwersalny preskryptywizm: sądy moralne są uniwersalizowalnymi nakazami.
Kluczowe idee
- Preskryptywizm
- Uniwersalizowalność
Uczniowie: Peter Singer
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 2
Immanuel Kant
pod wpływem
Hare built his universal prescriptivism on Kant’s universalizability and argued that Kant’s test leads to utilitarian results (Freedom and Reason, 1963; ‘Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?’, 1993). R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (1963); Moral Thinking (1981); “Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?”, Utilitas 5 (1993); SEP “Richard Mervyn Hare”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Immanuel Kant › 1724–1804
John Stuart Mill
pod wpływem
Hare linked his two levels of moral thinking – intuitive everyday rules and critical utilitarian reasoning – to Mill’s secondary principles and first principle (Moral Thinking, 1981). R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (1981); J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (1861/63); SEP “Richard Mervyn Hare”
Źródło: szkic AI
John Stuart Mill › 1806–1873
Wpływ na 1
Peter Singer uczeń/uczennica
uczeń/uczennica
Singer’s Oxford BPhil thesis on civil disobedience (1971) was supervised by Hare and appeared as Democracy and Disobedience (1973); Singer’s later preference utilitarianism draws on Hare’s universal prescriptivism. P. Singer, “An Intellectual Autobiography”, in J. A. Schaler (ed.), Peter Singer Under Fire (2009); P. Singer, Democracy and Disobedience (1973)
Źródło: szkic AI
Peter Singer › ur. 1946
Krytyka
Krytyka ze strony 2
Iris Murdoch
krytyka ze strony
Murdoch objected that Hare’s prescriptivism reduces morality to choice and universalisable rules, neglecting moral vision and the patient work of attention (The Sovereignty of Good, 1970). I. Murdoch, “Vision and Choice in Morality”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 30 (1956); The Sovereignty of Good (1970), “The Idea of Perfection”
Źródło: szkic AI
Iris Murdoch › 1919–1999
Philippa Foot
krytyka ze strony
Foot argued against Hare that not just anything can count as a moral reason: moral terms are tied to facts about human good and harm (‘Moral Beliefs’, 1958). P. Foot, “Moral Arguments”, Mind 67 (1958); “Moral Beliefs”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1958–59)
Źródło: szkic AI
Philippa Foot › 1920–2010
Krytykuje 1
Alfred Jules Ayer
krytykuje
Hare objected to emotivist theories like Ayer’s that they cannot tell moral reasoning from persuasion; moral judgements are universalisable prescriptions (The Language of Morals, 1952). R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (1952), ch. 1; Freedom and Reason (1963); A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936), ch. VI
Źródło: szkic AI
Alfred Jules Ayer › 1910–1989
Dzieła
Sądy moralne jako uniwersalizowalne nakazy.
Stanowisko
Hare wanted to show that moral judgments, though not statements of fact, are nonetheless subject to rational argument. A moral “ought,” he argued, is a prescription – akin to an imperative – that tells us what to do. Unlike a mere command, it is universalisable: whoever judges that I ought to do something in a situation must judge the same for anyone in exactly similar circumstances, including himself on the receiving end. This logical requirement forces us to put ourselves in the position of all those affected. Hare’s universal prescriptivism thus led to a form of preference utilitarianism, which he developed in Moral Thinking. His student Peter Singer carried this approach into applied ethics.
Życie i kontekst
Hare was born in Somerset in 1919. In the Second World War he was captured by the Japanese in Singapore and spent years as a prisoner of war, including forced labour on the Burma railway. He then taught at Oxford, from 1966 to 1983 as White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy, and later at the University of Florida.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- Freedom and Reason (1963)
- Moral Thinking (1981)
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