Agora思想的公共广场

罗伯特·诺齐克

1938–2002

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

人们拥有任何人都不得为了共同利益而加以凌驾的权利，所以唯一正义的国家是保护这些权利的最小国家。

定位

政治哲学与伦理学（20—21世纪） · 北美 · 政治与法, 伦理学

《无政府、国家与乌托邦》：自由至上主义、最小国家——以及体验机。

核心思想

  • 最小国家
  • 体验机
  • 持有正义理论

老师: 卡尔·古斯塔夫·亨普尔

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影响

受影响于 3

  • 约翰·洛克

    受其影响

    Nozick started from Locke’s state of nature and natural rights and reworked his proviso on just acquisition for an entitlement theory of justice (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974). R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974); J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1689); SEP “Libertarianism”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    约翰·洛克 › 1632–1704

  • 伊曼努尔·康德

    受其影响

    Nozick grounded his side constraints in Kant’s principle that individuals are ends and not merely means, ruling out sacrificing some for others (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974). R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974); SEP “Libertarianism”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    伊曼努尔·康德 › 1724–1804

  • 卡尔·古斯塔夫·亨普尔 师从

    师从

    Nozick wrote his Princeton dissertation, The Normative Theory of Individual Choice (1963), under Hempel’s supervision; it was printed in 1990. R. Nozick, The Normative Theory of Individual Choice (diss. Princeton 1963; printed 1990)

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    卡尔·古斯塔夫·亨普尔 › 1905–1997

批评

受批评于 2

  • 阿拉斯戴尔·麦金泰尔

    受其批评

    MacIntyre argued that Nozick’s entitlement theory, like Rawls’s, leaves out desert, and that their rival premises cannot be rationally settled in our culture (After Virtue, 1981, ch. 17). A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981), ch. 17 “Justice as a Virtue: Changing Conceptions”

    依据: AI 草稿

    阿拉斯戴尔·麦金泰尔 › 1929–2025

  • 查尔斯·泰勒

    受其批评

    Taylor argued against Nozick’s primacy of rights that ascribing rights presupposes an obligation to sustain the society in which the capacities they protect can develop (‘Atomism’, 1979). C. Taylor, “Atomism”, in A. Kontos (ed.), Powers, Possessions and Freedom (1979), repr. in Philosophical Papers 2 (1985)

    依据: AI 草稿

    查尔斯·泰勒 › 1931年生

批评了 1

  • 约翰·罗尔斯

    批评了

    Nozick objected that Rawls’s patterned principles can be upheld only by continual interference with free transactions, as the Wilt Chamberlain case shows (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974). R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), ch. 7

    依据: AI 草稿

    约翰·罗尔斯 › 1921–2002

作品

立场

Anarchy, State, and Utopia answered Rawls from a libertarian standpoint. Individuals have rights, Nozick argued, that set strict limits on what others and the state may do to them. Only a minimal state, limited to protection against force, theft and fraud, is justified; any more extensive state violates rights, for example by redistributing through taxation. A distribution is just not because it matches a pattern, but if it arose from just acquisition and voluntary transfer – the “entitlement theory.” His Wilt Chamberlain example was meant to show that liberty upsets patterns. In the same book he devised the “experience machine” to argue that we care about more than pleasant experiences. Nozick later distanced himself from parts of his libertarianism.

生平与背景

Nozick was born in Brooklyn in 1938 to a family of Russian Jewish immigrants. He studied at Columbia and Princeton and from 1969 taught at Harvard, where he was a colleague of John Rawls. His wide-ranging interests extended from political philosophy to epistemology, decision theory and the meaning of life. He died in 2002.

其他主要作品

  • Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)
  • Philosophical Explanations (1981)
  • The Examined Life (1989)
  • The Nature of Rationality (1993)

出现在

来源: Wikipedia · Wikidata

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