阿列克修斯·迈农
每一个思想都有一个对象,但对象不必存在:金山和圆的方虽然没有存在,却具有性质;因此,对象理论必须涵盖一切可被思想的东西,无论它存在与否。
定位
格拉茨的奥地利哲学家和心理学家,布伦塔诺的学生:每一个思想都指向一个对象,但并非每一个对象都存在;他的对象理论包括金山乃至圆的方,它们虽然没有存在,却具有性质。
核心思想
- 对象理论
- 不存在的对象
- 介于表象与判断之间的假定
- 价值理论
老师: 弗朗茨·布伦塔诺
学生: 克里斯蒂安·冯·埃伦费尔斯
影响
受影响于 4
大卫·休谟
受其影响
Meinong’s first works, Hume-Studien I (1877) on abstraction and nominalism and II (1882) on relations, began from Hume’s theory and prepared his own theory of relations. A. Meinong, Hume-Studien I: Zur Geschichte und Kritik des modernen Nominalismus (1877); Hume-Studien II: Zur Relationstheorie (1882); SEP “Alexius Meinong”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
大卫·休谟 › 1711–1776
弗朗茨·布伦塔诺 师从
师从 ✓
Meinong turned from history to philosophy under Brentano in Vienna (1875–78), who directed him to Hume; he habilitated there in 1878 with a study of Hume’s nominalism (Hume-Studien I, 1877). SEP “Alexius Meinong”; A. Meinong, “Selbstdarstellung” (1921)
弗朗茨·布伦塔诺 › 1838–1917
克里斯蒂安·冯·埃伦费尔斯 教过
教过
Ehrenfels followed Meinong from Vienna to Graz and took his doctorate under him in 1885; his ‘Über Gestaltqualitäten’ (1890) in turn gave Meinong a starting point for his theory of objects of higher order. B. Smith, Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano (1994); C. von Ehrenfels, “Über Gestaltqualitäten” (1890)
依据: AI 草稿
受其影响
Meinong answered Ehrenfels’s Gestalt qualities (1890) with a theory of founded contents (‘Zur Psychologie der Komplexionen und Relationen’, 1891), which led to his objects of higher order (1899). A. Meinong, “Zur Psychologie der Komplexionen und Relationen” (1891); “Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältniß zur inneren Wahrnehmung” (1899); SEP “Alexius Meinong”; SEP “Christian von Ehrenfels”
依据: AI 草稿
克里斯蒂安·冯·埃伦费尔斯 › 1859–1932
卡齐米日·特瓦尔多夫斯基
受其影响
Meinong built on Twardowski’s distinction between the content and object of a presentation (1894) in ‘Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung’ (1899), a step toward his theory of objects (1904). A. Meinong, “Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältniß zur inneren Wahrnehmung” (1899); “Über Gegenstandstheorie” (1904); K. Twardowski, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen (1894); SEP “Alexius Meinong”
依据: AI 草稿
卡齐米日·特瓦尔多夫斯基 › 1866–1938
影响了 1
阿兰·洛克
影响了
Locke’s theory of value, set out in his Harvard dissertation The Problem of Classification in Theory of Value (1918), drew on the Austrian value theory of Meinong, Ehrenfels and Brentano, which he had studied in Berlin in 1910–11. SEP “Alain LeRoy Locke”; A. Locke, The Problem of Classification in Theory of Value (dissertation, Harvard, 1918)
依据: AI 草稿
阿兰·洛克 › 1885–1954
批评
受批评于 1
伯特兰·罗素
受其批评
Russell objected that Meinong’s non-existent objects, such as the round square, infringe the law of contradiction, and analysed them away with his theory of descriptions (‘On Denoting’, 1905). B. Russell, “On Denoting”, Mind 14 (1905), 479–493; SEP “Alexius Meinong”
依据: AI 草稿
伯特兰·罗素 › 1872–1970
作品
立场
Meinong is on the map as the author of the theory of objects, a much-debated idea from the Brentano school. Starting from Brentano’s thesis that every mental act is directed at an object, and from Twardowski’s distinction between content and object, he concluded that the objects of thought need not exist. The golden mountain is golden and a mountain, the round square is round and square: both are objects with properties, though they have no being – a principle he called the independence of so-being from being. Objects may exist (like a horse), subsist (like the difference between red and green) or have no being at all. In “On Assumptions” (1902) he placed, between idea and judgement, the assumption – entertaining a thought without believing it – and called its object an “objective”, an early version of what later philosophers call propositions. He also developed a psychological theory of value, in debate with Ehrenfels. Russell first welcomed his theory and then rejected it in “On Denoting” (1905), arguing that non-existent objects violate the law of non-contradiction; for decades Meinong was known mainly through this critique. Since the 1970s logicians such as Terence Parsons and Richard Routley have revived “Meinongian” theories of non-existent objects.
生平与背景
Alexius Meinong was born on 17 July 1853 in Lemberg (Lviv), then in the Austrian Empire, the son of an army officer. He studied history and German philology in Vienna, took a doctorate in history in 1874 and then turned to philosophy under Franz Brentano (1875–78), with whom he worked on Hume. In 1882 he moved to the University of Graz, where he became full professor in 1889 and remained for the rest of his life. There he founded in 1894 the first laboratory of experimental psychology in Austria, and around him formed the “Graz school”, whose members included Christian von Ehrenfels, Stephan Witasek, Vittorio Benussi and Ernst Mally. His eyesight was poor from his youth, and in later life he was almost blind. He died in Graz on 27 November 1920.
其他主要作品
- Hume-Studien I–II (1877, 1882)
- Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth-Theorie (1894)
- Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältniss zur inneren Wahrnehmung (1899)
- Über Annahmen (1902)
- Über Gegenstandstheorie (1904)
- Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit (1915)
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