Alexius Meinong
Every thought has an object, but objects need not exist: the golden mountain and the round square have properties although they have no being; a theory of objects must therefore cover everything that can be thought, whether it exists or not.
Placement
Austrian philosopher and psychologist in Graz, a student of Brentano: every thought is directed at an object, but not every object exists; his theory of objects includes the golden mountain and even the round square, which have properties though they have no being.
Key ideas
- Theory of objects
- Non-existent objects
- Assumptions between idea and judgement
- Value theory
Teachers: Franz Brentano
Students: Christian von Ehrenfels
Influence
Influenced by 4
David Hume
influenced by
Meinong’s first works, Hume-Studien I (1877) on abstraction and nominalism and II (1882) on relations, began from Hume’s theory and prepared his own theory of relations. A. Meinong, Hume-Studien I: Zur Geschichte und Kritik des modernen Nominalismus (1877); Hume-Studien II: Zur Relationstheorie (1882); SEP “Alexius Meinong”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
David Hume › 1711–1776
Franz Brentano studied with
studied with ✓
Meinong turned from history to philosophy under Brentano in Vienna (1875–78), who directed him to Hume; he habilitated there in 1878 with a study of Hume’s nominalism (Hume-Studien I, 1877). SEP “Alexius Meinong”; A. Meinong, “Selbstdarstellung” (1921)
Franz Brentano › 1838–1917
Christian von Ehrenfels taught
taught
Ehrenfels followed Meinong from Vienna to Graz and took his doctorate under him in 1885; his ‘Über Gestaltqualitäten’ (1890) in turn gave Meinong a starting point for his theory of objects of higher order. B. Smith, Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano (1994); C. von Ehrenfels, “Über Gestaltqualitäten” (1890)
Evidence: AI draft
influenced by
Meinong answered Ehrenfels’s Gestalt qualities (1890) with a theory of founded contents (‘Zur Psychologie der Komplexionen und Relationen’, 1891), which led to his objects of higher order (1899). A. Meinong, “Zur Psychologie der Komplexionen und Relationen” (1891); “Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältniß zur inneren Wahrnehmung” (1899); SEP “Alexius Meinong”; SEP “Christian von Ehrenfels”
Evidence: AI draft
Christian von Ehrenfels › 1859–1932
Kazimierz Twardowski
influenced by
Meinong built on Twardowski’s distinction between the content and object of a presentation (1894) in ‘Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung’ (1899), a step toward his theory of objects (1904). A. Meinong, “Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältniß zur inneren Wahrnehmung” (1899); “Über Gegenstandstheorie” (1904); K. Twardowski, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen (1894); SEP “Alexius Meinong”
Evidence: AI draft
Kazimierz Twardowski › 1866–1938
Influenced 1
Alain Locke
influenced
Locke’s theory of value, set out in his Harvard dissertation The Problem of Classification in Theory of Value (1918), drew on the Austrian value theory of Meinong, Ehrenfels and Brentano, which he had studied in Berlin in 1910–11. SEP “Alain LeRoy Locke”; A. Locke, The Problem of Classification in Theory of Value (dissertation, Harvard, 1918)
Evidence: AI draft
Alain Locke › 1885–1954
Criticism
Criticized by 1
Bertrand Russell
criticised by
Russell objected that Meinong’s non-existent objects, such as the round square, infringe the law of contradiction, and analysed them away with his theory of descriptions (‘On Denoting’, 1905). B. Russell, “On Denoting”, Mind 14 (1905), 479–493; SEP “Alexius Meinong”
Evidence: AI draft
Bertrand Russell › 1872–1970
Works
- 1902On Assumptions
Between idea and judgement lies the assumption: thinking that something is the case without believing it, as in supposing, playing, reading fiction or arguing hypothetically; its object is an “objective”, the bearer of truth and falsity.
Programmatic essay for a science of all objects, whether they exist or not: an object has its properties independently of its being, so that “the round square” is round and square although there is no such thing.
Position
Meinong is on the map as the author of the theory of objects, a much-debated idea from the Brentano school. Starting from Brentano’s thesis that every mental act is directed at an object, and from Twardowski’s distinction between content and object, he concluded that the objects of thought need not exist. The golden mountain is golden and a mountain, the round square is round and square: both are objects with properties, though they have no being – a principle he called the independence of so-being from being. Objects may exist (like a horse), subsist (like the difference between red and green) or have no being at all. In “On Assumptions” (1902) he placed, between idea and judgement, the assumption – entertaining a thought without believing it – and called its object an “objective”, an early version of what later philosophers call propositions. He also developed a psychological theory of value, in debate with Ehrenfels. Russell first welcomed his theory and then rejected it in “On Denoting” (1905), arguing that non-existent objects violate the law of non-contradiction; for decades Meinong was known mainly through this critique. Since the 1970s logicians such as Terence Parsons and Richard Routley have revived “Meinongian” theories of non-existent objects.
Life & context
Alexius Meinong was born on 17 July 1853 in Lemberg (Lviv), then in the Austrian Empire, the son of an army officer. He studied history and German philology in Vienna, took a doctorate in history in 1874 and then turned to philosophy under Franz Brentano (1875–78), with whom he worked on Hume. In 1882 he moved to the University of Graz, where he became full professor in 1889 and remained for the rest of his life. There he founded in 1894 the first laboratory of experimental psychology in Austria, and around him formed the “Graz school”, whose members included Christian von Ehrenfels, Stephan Witasek, Vittorio Benussi and Ernst Mally. His eyesight was poor from his youth, and in later life he was almost blind. He died in Graz on 27 November 1920.
Further main works
- Hume-Studien I–II (1877, 1882)
- Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth-Theorie (1894)
- Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältniss zur inneren Wahrnehmung (1899)
- Über Annahmen (1902)
- Über Gegenstandstheorie (1904)
- Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit (1915)
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