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陈那

约480–540年

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

只有知觉和推理才提供真正的知识——而语词并不直接命名事物，而是通过排除一物所不是的东西来起作用。

定位

南亚与藏传哲学 · 南亚 · 逻辑学, 认识论, 语言

创立了佛教的逻辑与认识论学派（量，pramana）：知识的来源只有两种，即现量（感知）与比量（推理）；词语靠排除其不适用的事物来获得意义（遮诠，apoha）。

核心思想

  • 量论（pramana）
  • 遮诠（apoha，经由排除获得意义）

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影响

受影响于 2

  • 世亲

    受其影响 ✓

    Tradition makes Dignaga a pupil of Vasubandhu; his Investigation of the Object continues Vasubandhu’s argument in the Twenty Verses against external objects. D. Duckworth et al., Dignaga’s Investigation of the Percept (2016); SEP “Vasubandhu”

    依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata

    世亲 › 约350–430年

  • 伐致呵利

    受其影响

    Dignaga reworked verses of Bhartrhari’s Vakyapadiya in his Examination of the Three Times and engaged his philosophy of language in developing the theory of exclusion (apoha). E. Frauwallner, “Dignaga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung”, WZKSO 3 (1959); R. P. Hayes, Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs (1988)

    依据: AI 草稿

    伐致呵利 › 约450–510年

影响了 2

  • 法称

    影响了

    Dharmakirti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition (Pramanavarttika) is formally a commentary on Dignaga’s Compendium of Valid Cognition, but reworks his epistemology into a system of its own. Dharmakirti, Pramanavarttika; SEP “Dharmakīrti”

    依据: AI 草稿

    法称 › 约600–660年

  • 比马尔·克里希纳·马蒂拉尔

    影响了

    Matilal reconstructed Dignaga’s theory of meaning as exclusion (apoha) and his account of perception with the tools of analytic philosophy (Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar, 1971; Perception, 1986). B. K. Matilal, Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (1971); Perception (1986)

    依据: AI 草稿

    比马尔·克里希纳·马蒂拉尔 › 1935–1991

批评

受批评于 2

  • 鸠摩利罗·跋陀

    受其批评

    Kumarila rejected Dignaga’s apoha theory, word meaning as exclusion of others, and his account of perception (Shlokavarttika, Apohavada and Pratyaksha chapters). Kumārila, Ślokavārttika; J. Taber, A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology, 2005

    依据: AI 草稿

    鸠摩利罗·跋陀 › 约590–650年

  • 月称

    受其批评

    Chandrakirti rejected Dignaga’s epistemology – perception free of concepts and two kinds of object – accepting the means of knowledge only conventionally (Prasannapada I). Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā I; D. Arnold, Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief, 2005

    依据: AI 草稿

    月称 › 约600–650年

批评了 1

  • 足目·乔达摩

    批评了

    Dignaga accepted only perception and inference as means of knowledge, against the Nyaya-sutra’s four, and criticised its definition of perception (Pramanasamuccaya I–II). Dignāga, Pramāṇasamuccaya I–II; M. Hattori, Dignāga, On Perception, 1968

    依据: AI 草稿

    足目·乔达摩 › 约120–190年

作品

立场

Dignaga put Buddhist philosophy on a rigorous epistemological footing. He recognised only two valid means of knowledge (pramana): perception, which grasps unique, momentary particulars free of concepts, and inference, which works with general concepts. Concepts, he argued, do not name real universals but work by exclusion (apoha): “cow” means whatever is not non-cow. He also reformed Indian logic with his “wheel of reasons”, a systematic theory of valid and invalid inferences. Through Dharmakirti his work set the agenda for centuries of debate between Buddhist, Hindu and Jain philosophers.

生平与背景

Dignaga was a Buddhist logician from southern India, probably active around 500 CE. Tradition makes him a pupil of Vasubandhu and connects him with the great monastic university of Nalanda. Most of his works survive only in Tibetan and Chinese translations. He founded the Buddhist school of epistemology that Dharmakirti later carried forward.

其他主要作品

  • Investigation of the Object (Ālambanaparīkṣā, c. 500 CE)

来源: Wikipedia · Wikidata

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