Dignaga
Only perception and inference give real knowledge – and words do not name things directly but work by excluding what a thing is not.
Placement
Founded the Buddhist school of logic and epistemology (pramana): there are only two means of knowledge, perception and inference, and words mean by excluding what they do not apply to (apoha).
Key ideas
- Pramana theory
- Apoha (meaning through exclusion)
Influence
Influenced by 2
Vasubandhu
influenced by ✓
Tradition makes Dignaga a pupil of Vasubandhu; his Investigation of the Object continues Vasubandhu’s argument in the Twenty Verses against external objects. D. Duckworth et al., Dignaga’s Investigation of the Percept (2016); SEP “Vasubandhu”
Evidence: also in Wikidata · Wikidata
Vasubandhu › c. 350–430
Bhartrhari
influenced by
Dignaga reworked verses of Bhartrhari’s Vakyapadiya in his Examination of the Three Times and engaged his philosophy of language in developing the theory of exclusion (apoha). E. Frauwallner, “Dignaga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung”, WZKSO 3 (1959); R. P. Hayes, Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs (1988)
Evidence: AI draft
Bhartrhari › c. 450–510
Influenced 2
Dharmakirti
influenced
Dharmakirti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition (Pramanavarttika) is formally a commentary on Dignaga’s Compendium of Valid Cognition, but reworks his epistemology into a system of its own. Dharmakirti, Pramanavarttika; SEP “Dharmakīrti”
Evidence: AI draft
Dharmakirti › c. 600–660
Bimal Krishna Matilal
influenced
Matilal reconstructed Dignaga’s theory of meaning as exclusion (apoha) and his account of perception with the tools of analytic philosophy (Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar, 1971; Perception, 1986). B. K. Matilal, Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (1971); Perception (1986)
Evidence: AI draft
Bimal Krishna Matilal › 1935–1991
Criticism
Criticized by 2
Kumarila Bhatta
criticised by
Kumarila rejected Dignaga’s apoha theory, word meaning as exclusion of others, and his account of perception (Shlokavarttika, Apohavada and Pratyaksha chapters). Kumārila, Ślokavārttika; J. Taber, A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology, 2005
Evidence: AI draft
Kumarila Bhatta › c. 590–650
Chandrakirti
criticised by
Chandrakirti rejected Dignaga’s epistemology – perception free of concepts and two kinds of object – accepting the means of knowledge only conventionally (Prasannapada I). Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā I; D. Arnold, Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief, 2005
Evidence: AI draft
Chandrakirti › c. 600–650
Criticizes 1
Akshapada Gautama
criticised
Dignaga accepted only perception and inference as means of knowledge, against the Nyaya-sutra’s four, and criticised its definition of perception (Pramanasamuccaya I–II). Dignāga, Pramāṇasamuccaya I–II; M. Hattori, Dignāga, On Perception, 1968
Evidence: AI draft
Akshapada Gautama › c. 120–190
Works
- c. 520Pramanasamuccaya
A compendium of the valid means of knowledge: perception and inference.
Position
Dignaga put Buddhist philosophy on a rigorous epistemological footing. He recognised only two valid means of knowledge (pramana): perception, which grasps unique, momentary particulars free of concepts, and inference, which works with general concepts. Concepts, he argued, do not name real universals but work by exclusion (apoha): “cow” means whatever is not non-cow. He also reformed Indian logic with his “wheel of reasons”, a systematic theory of valid and invalid inferences. Through Dharmakirti his work set the agenda for centuries of debate between Buddhist, Hindu and Jain philosophers.
Life & context
Dignaga was a Buddhist logician from southern India, probably active around 500 CE. Tradition makes him a pupil of Vasubandhu and connects him with the great monastic university of Nalanda. Most of his works survive only in Tibetan and Chinese translations. He founded the Buddhist school of epistemology that Dharmakirti later carried forward.
Further main works
- Investigation of the Object (Ālambanaparīkṣā, c. 500 CE)
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