Agora思想的公共广场

法称

约600–660年

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

只有具有效果的东西才是实在的，一切实在的东西只持续一刹那，而只有知觉和推理是认识它的可靠方式。

定位

南亚与藏传哲学 · 逻辑学, 认识论, 形而上学

佛教逻辑学家与认识论者，将陈那的知识理论体系化：只有现量与比量是有效的；真实的东西就是具有因果效力的东西，而一切真实的事物都是刹那生灭的。

核心思想

  • 二量
  • 因果效力是实在的标志
  • 刹那灭
  • 遮诠（apoha，排除）

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影响

受影响于 1

  • 陈那

    受其影响

    Dharmakirti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition (Pramanavarttika) is formally a commentary on Dignaga’s Compendium of Valid Cognition, but reworks his epistemology into a system of its own. Dharmakirti, Pramanavarttika; SEP “Dharmakīrti”

    依据: AI 草稿

    陈那 › 约480–540年

影响了 2

  • 寂护

    影响了

    Shantarakshita’s Compendium of Principles (Tattvasangraha) applies Dharmakirti’s epistemology and theory of inference to examine and reject the doctrines of rival schools. Santaraksita, Tattvasamgraha, with Kamalasila’s Panjika; SEP “Śāntarakṣita”

    依据: AI 草稿

    寂护 › 约725–788年

  • 宗喀巴

    影响了

    Tsongkhapa integrated Dharmakirti’s epistemology into his Madhyamaka and wrote an introduction to Dharmakirti’s seven logical treatises (Gateway to the Seven Treatises). T. Jinpa, Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy (2002); G. B. J. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality (1997)

    依据: AI 草稿

    宗喀巴 › 1357–1419

批评

受批评于 2

  • 新护

    受其批评

    Following Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta argued against Dharmakirti’s Buddhist epistemology that memory and recognition presuppose one enduring, self-aware consciousness (Ishvarapratyabhijnavimarshini). Abhinavagupta, Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī I; I. Ratié, Le Soi et l’Autre, 2011

    依据: AI 草稿

    新护 › 约950–1016年

  • 乌陀衍那

    受其批评

    Udayana defended an enduring self against Dharmakirti’s school, rejecting momentariness and the denial of external objects (Atmatattvaviveka) and its arguments against God (Nyayakusumanjali). Udayana, Ātmatattvaviveka; Nyāyakusumāñjali; K. H. Potter (ed.), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies II, 1977

    依据: AI 草稿

    乌陀衍那 › 约950–1020年

批评了 1

  • 鸠摩利罗·跋陀

    批评了

    Dharmakirti attacked the Mimamsa doctrine of an authorless, self-valid Veda that Kumarila defended; whether he answered Kumarila himself is debated. Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika I with Svavṛtti; V. Eltschinger, Penser l’autorité des Écritures, 2007

    依据: AI 草稿

    鸠摩利罗·跋陀 › 约590–650年

作品

  • 约640年释量论（Pramanavarttika）

    对陈那的注释，成为佛教认识论的标准著作：知觉、推理，唯有刹那的个别事物是真实的。

立场

Dharmakirti systematised Dignaga’s epistemology. There are only two means of knowledge: perception, which grasps unique, momentary particulars free of concepts, and inference, which works with general concepts. What is real is what has causal efficacy; since whatever is efficacious must change at every moment, all real things are momentary. Universals are mental constructs, explained by exclusion (apoha): “cow” means “not non-cow”. Valid reasons rest on identity of nature, on causation or on non-perception. With these tools he defended rebirth and the Buddha’s authority against materialists and rejected God, an enduring self and the Mimamsa doctrine of the authorless Veda – a dispute tied to Kumarila, though who answered whom is debated.

生平与背景

According to later Tibetan histories, Dharmakirti was born into a Brahmin family in South India, became a Buddhist monk and studied at Nalanda, where a pupil of Dignaga taught him. These accounts are late and partly legendary. He is usually dated to the 7th century CE, about 600–660, but some scholars now place him earlier, around 550–610. His works became the standard of Buddhist epistemology in India and Tibet.

其他主要作品

  • Ascertainment of Valid Cognition (Pramanavinishcaya, 7th century CE)
  • A Drop of Reasoning (Nyayabindu, 7th century CE)

出现在

来源: Wikipedia · Wikidata

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