توم ريجان
للحيوانات التي تختبر حياتها بنفسها حقوق، فلا يجوز لنا استخدامها مجرّد أدوات – لا للغذاء ولا للعلم ولا للرياضة – حتى لو أفضى ذلك إلى نتائج حسنة.
التموضع
فيلسوف حقوق الحيوان في جامعة ولاية كارولاينا الشمالية: لكل «ذات-حياة» قيمة ذاتية متساوية ولا يجوز استخدامها وسيلةً محضة – والهدف ليس أقفاصًا أكبر بل أقفاصًا فارغة.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- ذات-حياة (subject-of-a-life)
- القيمة الذاتية ومبدأ الاحترام
- الإلغائية
النقد
ينتقد 3
رينيه ديكارت
انتقد
Regan rejected Descartes’ denial of consciousness to animals as unfounded: many mammals are ‘subjects-of-a-life’ with beliefs, desires and inherent value (The Case for Animal Rights, 1983, ch. 1). T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1983), ch. 1; R. Descartes, Discours de la méthode (1637), part V
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
رينيه ديكارت › 1596–1650
إيمانويل كانط تأثّر بـ
تأثّر بـ
Regan extended Kant’s principle of respect – never to treat someone merely as a means – to all ‘subjects-of-a-life’ with inherent value (The Case for Animal Rights, 1983). T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1983); SEP “The Moral Status of Animals”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
انتقد
Regan rejected Kant’s view that we have only indirect duties concerning animals: beings with inherent value are owed direct duties of respect (The Case for Animal Rights, 1983). T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1983), ch. 5 (indirect duty views); I. Kant, Lectures on Ethics (Collins), “Of Duties towards Animals and Spirits”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
إيمانويل كانط › 1724–1804
بيتر سنجر
انتقد
Regan objected that Singer’s utilitarianism cannot secure animal rights: aggregating interests could justify harming individuals, treated as mere receptacles of value (The Case for Animal Rights, 1983). T. Regan, “Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 (1980); The Case for Animal Rights (1983); P. Singer, “Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 (1980)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
بيتر سنجر › وُلد 1946
الموقف
“The Case for Animal Rights” is the classic statement of a rights-based, as opposed to utilitarian, animal ethics. Utilitarians such as Singer argue that animal suffering counts equally in the sum of good and bad consequences; Regan objected that this treats individuals as mere receptacles of value, who could be sacrificed whenever the totals came out better. Instead, every being that is the “subject-of-a-life” – that has beliefs and desires, perception and memory, a sense of its own future, an emotional life and a welfare that matters to it – has inherent value, and inherent value is equal: one either has it or not. Such beings have a right to be treated with respect, never merely as means to the ends of others. Regan thus extended Kant’s principle of respect to animals, against Kant’s own view that we have only indirect duties concerning them. His conclusion is abolitionist – “not larger cages, empty cages”: an end to animal agriculture, to animal experimentation and to commercial and sport hunting.
الحياة والسياق
Tom Regan (1938–2017) was born in Pittsburgh, studied at Thiel College and took his doctorate at the University of Virginia in 1966. From 1967 he taught at North Carolina State University in Raleigh, where he headed the department of philosophy and religion in the late 1990s and became professor emeritus on his retirement in 2002. Besides moral philosophy in general he wrote on G. E. Moore; from the 1970s the moral status of animals became his central theme, and in 1976 he co-edited an influential anthology with Peter Singer. With his wife Nancy he founded the Culture & Animals Foundation in 1985, and he remained active in the animal-rights movement until his death in Raleigh.
الأعمال الرئيسة
- Animal Rights and Human Obligations (ed. with Peter Singer, 1976)
- All That Dwell Therein (1982)
- The Case for Animal Rights (1983)
- Bloomsbury’s Prophet (1986)
- Empty Cages (2004)
يرد في
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