Johann Gottlieb Fichte
For Fichte, the self is not a thing but an act: it creates itself through its own activity, and the world is the resistance it needs for freedom.
Placement
The I posits itself and the not-I: the Wissenschaftslehre as a philosophy of freedom.
Key ideas
- Tathandlung (act-deed)
- I and not-I
- Recognition
Influence
Influenced by 3
Baruch de Spinoza
influenced by ✓
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre (1794) put the absolute I where Spinoza had put substance, and Fichte saw in Spinoza’s system the consistent form of dogmatism. J. G. Fichte, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre (1794); Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre (1797); SEP “Johann Gottlieb Fichte”
Evidence: also in Wikidata · Wikidata
Baruch de Spinoza › 1632–1677
Jean-Jacques Rousseau
influenced by ✓
Fichte’s Lectures on the Scholar’s Vocation (1794) examined Rousseau’s claims about the arts and sciences, honouring him but turning his longing for the past into forward striving. J. G. Fichte, Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten (1794); SEP “Johann Gottlieb Fichte”
Evidence: also in Wikidata · Wikidata
Jean-Jacques Rousseau › 1712–1778
Immanuel Kant
influenced by ✓
Fichte’s Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation (1792), published anonymously, was taken for Kant’s; his Wissenschaftslehre (1794) sought to derive Kant’s results from a single principle. J. G. Fichte, Versuch einer Critik aller Offenbarung (1792); Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre (1794); SEP “Johann Gottlieb Fichte”
Evidence: also in Wikidata · Wikidata
Immanuel Kant › 1724–1804
Influenced 4
Novalis
influenced
In the Fichte Studies (1795–96) Novalis worked through the Wissenschaftslehre note by note and developed from it the reflections that later led to his ‘magical idealism’. Novalis, Fichte-Studien (1795–96); SEP “Novalis”
Evidence: AI draft
Novalis › 1772–1801
Friedrich Schlegel
influenced
Schlegel counted Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, with the French Revolution and Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, among the great ‘tendencies of the age’ (Athenaeum, 1798) and based his irony on Fichtean self-reflection. F. Schlegel, Athenaeum fragments (1798); SEP “Friedrich Schlegel”
Evidence: AI draft
Friedrich Schlegel › 1772–1829
Mikhail Bakunin
influenced
In his Moscow years Bakunin translated Fichte’s lectures on the vocation of the scholar (1794) into Russian (1836) and passed through a Fichtean idealism before turning to Hegel. J. G. Fichte, Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten (1794), Russian tr. M. Bakunin (1836); E. H. Carr, Michael Bakunin (1937); A. Kelly, Mikhail Bakunin (1982)
Evidence: AI draft
Mikhail Bakunin › 1814–1876
Nishida Kitarō
influenced
In Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness (1917) Nishida took up Fichte’s self-positing act (Tathandlung) to work out self-awareness as the unity of intuition and reflection. Nishida Kitarō, Jikaku ni okeru chokkan to hansei (1917), tr. V. H. Viglielmo et al., Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness (1987); SEP “Nishida Kitarō”
Evidence: AI draft
Nishida Kitarō › 1870–1945
Criticism
Criticized by 5
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel influenced
influenced ✓
Hegel took over the concept of recognition introduced in Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right (1796) and made it central to his Jena writings and the Phenomenology (1807). J. G. Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts (1796); G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807); L. Siep, Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie (1979); SEP “Hegel”
Evidence: also in Wikidata · Wikidata
criticised by
Hegel argued that Fichte’s identity of I and not-I remains a mere ought, a ‘subjective subject-object’ without Schelling’s objective side (Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System, 1801). G. W. F. Hegel, Differenz des Fichte’schen und Schelling’schen Systems der Philosophie (1801); Glauben und Wissen (1802), C; SEP “Hegel”
Evidence: AI draft
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel › 1770–1831
Friedrich Hölderlin influenced
influenced
Hölderlin heard Fichte’s lectures in Jena in the winter of 1794–95 and studied the Wissenschaftslehre closely; his own philosophical sketches start from its problem of the absolute I. J. G. Fichte, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre (1794); F. Hölderlin, letters from Jena (1794–95); D. Henrich, Der Grund im Bewußtsein (1992)
Evidence: AI draft
criticised by
Hölderlin objected that Fichte’s absolute I, lacking any object, could have no consciousness, and placed Being before the division of subject and object (‘Urtheil und Seyn’, 1795). F. Hölderlin, “Urtheil und Seyn” (1795); letter to Hegel, 26 Jan. 1795; D. Henrich, Der Grund im Bewußtsein (1992)
Evidence: AI draft
Friedrich Hölderlin › 1770–1843
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling influenced
influenced ✓
In Of the I as Principle of Philosophy (1795) Schelling started from Fichte’s absolute I; his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) still followed the Wissenschaftslehre’s method. F. W. J. Schelling, Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie (1795); System des transcendentalen Idealismus (1800); SEP “Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling”
Evidence: also in Wikidata · Wikidata
criticised by
Schelling objected that Fichte reduced nature to a mere obstacle for the striving I, whereas nature is itself productive (Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses, 1806). F. W. J. Schelling, Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Naturphilosophie zu der verbesserten Fichteschen Lehre (1806); Fichte–Schelling correspondence 1800–1801; SEP “Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling”
Evidence: AI draft
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling › 1775–1854
Arthur Schopenhauer
criticised by
Schopenhauer held that Fichte, deriving the object from the subject, made the mirror-image error of materialism (The World as Will and Representation, 1819, I §7). A. Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I (1819), §7; SEP “Arthur Schopenhauer”
Evidence: AI draft
Arthur Schopenhauer › 1788–1860
Isaiah Berlin
criticised by
Berlin counted Fichte among the ‘enemies of human liberty’: his true self, merged with the nation, made positive liberty a licence for coercion (Freedom and Its Betrayal, 1952). I. Berlin, Freedom and Its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty (BBC lectures 1952; publ. 2002); “Two Concepts of Liberty” (1958)
Evidence: AI draft
Isaiah Berlin › 1909–1997
Works
The I posits itself – philosophy from a single principle.
Position
Fichte wanted to complete Kant by deriving all philosophy from a single principle. That principle is the self-positing “I”: before any object is known, the self is an activity that posits itself – a “deed-act” (Tathandlung) rather than a fact. The world appears as the “not-I” against which this freedom meets resistance and so becomes concrete. Fichte also showed that self-consciousness requires other free beings who summon us to act, making recognition a condition of selfhood and of right. His thought launched German Idealism, provoked Schelling and Hegel, and his idea of mutual recognition passed through Hegel to today’s theories of recognition.
Life & context
Fichte grew up poor in Upper Lusatia and owed his schooling to a patron. His first book, published anonymously, was taken for a work of Kant and made him famous overnight. He taught at Jena until the “atheism dispute” of 1799 forced him out, then lived in Berlin, where he gave his patriotic Addresses to the German Nation and became the new university’s first elected rector.
Further main works
- Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation (1792)
- Foundations of Natural Right (1796)
- The Vocation of Man (1800)
- Addresses to the German Nation (1808)
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