Alfred Tarski
Zdanie jest prawdziwe, jeśli rzeczy mają się tak, jak mówi – „śnieg jest biały” jest prawdziwe wtedy i tylko wtedy, gdy śnieg jest biały – i da się to dokładnie zdefiniować dla języków formalnych.
Umiejscowienie
Polsko-amerykański logik: podał pierwszą ścisłą definicję prawdy dla języków formalnych („śnieg jest biały” jest prawdziwe wtedy i tylko wtedy, gdy śnieg jest biały) oraz wynikania logicznego; twórca teorii modeli.
Kluczowe idee
- Semantyczna koncepcja prawdy
- Konwencja T
- Język przedmiotowy i metajęzyk
- Teoria modeli
Nauczyciele: Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 4
Arystoteles
pod wpływem
Tarski presented his semantic definition of truth as a precise form of Aristotle’s formula ‘to say of what is that it is … is true’ (1944). A. Tarski, “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (1944); Aristotle, Metaphysics IV (Γ); SEP “Tarski’s Truth Definitions”
Źródło: szkic AI
Arystoteles › 384–322 p.n.e.
Jan Łukasiewicz nauczyciel(ka)
nauczyciel(ka) ✓
Tarski took Łukasiewicz’s courses in logic in Warsaw (1918–24); the two later published ‘Untersuchungen über den Aussagenkalkül’ (1930) together. Teacher and later collaborator, not supervisor. SEP “Alfred Tarski”; J. Łukasiewicz & A. Tarski, “Untersuchungen über den Aussagenkalkül” (1930)
Źródło: także w Wikidanych · Wikidata
Jan Łukasiewicz › 1878–1956
Tadeusz Kotarbiński nauczyciel(ka)
nauczyciel(ka)
Tarski studied in Warsaw from 1918 to 1924, taking courses with Kotarbiński among others; he dedicated his collected papers Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (1956) ‘to his teacher Tadeusz Kotarbiński’. SEP “Alfred Tarski”; A. Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (1956), dedication
Źródło: szkic AI
Tadeusz Kotarbiński › 1886–1981
Stanisław Leśniewski nauczyciel(ka)
nauczyciel(ka)
Tarski took his doctorate in Warsaw in 1924 under Leśniewski’s supervision, with a thesis on the primitive term of logistic. SEP “Alfred Tarski”; A. B. Feferman & S. Feferman, Alfred Tarski: Life and Logic (2004)
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Stanisław Leśniewski › 1886–1939
Wpływ na 3
Rudolf Carnap
wpływ na ✓
After talks with Tarski from 1930, Carnap adopted Tarski’s semantic concept of truth and turned from logical syntax to semantics (Introduction to Semantics, 1942). R. Carnap, Introduction to Semantics (1942); “Intellectual Autobiography”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963); SEP “Rudolf Carnap”; SEP “Tarski’s Truth Definitions”
Źródło: także w Wikidanych · Wikidata
Rudolf Carnap › 1891–1970
Karl Popper
wpływ na
Popper credited Tarski, who explained his theory to him in Vienna (1935), with rehabilitating correspondence truth, and built on it his notion of verisimilitude (Conjectures and Refutations, 1963). K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (1963); Objective Knowledge (1972); Unended Quest (1976); SEP “Karl Popper”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Karl Popper › 1902–1994
Donald Davidson
wpływ na ✓
Davidson turned Tarski’s Convention T around: a theory that yields a T-sentence for every sentence of a language serves as a theory of meaning (‘Truth and Meaning’, 1967). D. Davidson, “Truth and Meaning”, Synthese 17 (1967); A. Tarski, “Pojęcie prawdy w językach nauk dedukcyjnych” (1933; German 1935); SEP “Donald Davidson”
Donald Davidson › 1917–2003
Krytyka
Krytyka ze strony 1
Saul Kripke
krytyka ze strony
Kripke judged Tarski’s language hierarchy unfit for natural language and built, via fixed points, a language containing its own truth predicate (‘Outline of a Theory of Truth’, 1975). S. Kripke, “Outline of a Theory of Truth”, Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975), 690–716
Źródło: szkic AI
Saul Kripke › 1940–2022
Dzieła
Definicja prawdy dla języków formalnych, podana w bogatszym metajęzyku – oraz dowód, że żaden taki język nie może zdefiniować własnej prawdy.
Przystępne przedstawienie jego teorii: „śnieg jest biały” jest prawdziwe wtedy i tylko wtedy, gdy śnieg jest biały – precyzyjna postać klasycznej koncepcji Arystotelesa.
Stanowisko
Tarski’s monograph on truth (Polish 1933, German 1935) asked how the word “true” can be used without falling into paradoxes such as the liar. His answer distinguishes an object language from the metalanguage in which we talk about it. A definition of truth for the object language is adequate if it entails, for every sentence, an instance of “Convention T”: “snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white. For formal languages he gave such a definition, built up through the notion of satisfaction, and proved that no sufficiently rich language can define its own truth predicate. The Semantic Conception of Truth (1944) presented this as a precise form of Aristotle’s classical conception. In 1936 he defined logical consequence: a conclusion follows if every interpretation that makes the premises true makes it true. These definitions founded model theory, which he developed at Berkeley, along with decision procedures for elementary algebra and geometry. Carnap’s turn from syntax to semantics followed his meetings with Tarski, Popper credited him with rehabilitating the correspondence theory of truth, and Davidson built a theory of meaning on Convention T. Kripke’s theory of truth of 1975 was designed to avoid Tarski’s hierarchy of languages.
Życie i kontekst
Alfred Tarski was born Alfred Tajtelbaum in Warsaw in 1901 into an assimilated Jewish family. In 1923 he and his brother changed their name to Tarski, and he became a Roman Catholic. He took his doctorate under Stanisław Leśniewski in 1924, the year of the Banach–Tarski paradox, and belonged to the Lwów–Warsaw school of logic. He never obtained a chair in Poland – antisemitism is thought to have played a part – and taught for years at a Warsaw secondary school alongside his university lectures. In August 1939 he travelled to a congress for the Unity of Science at Harvard and was cut off by the outbreak of war. His wife and children survived in Poland and joined him in 1946; his parents and his brother did not survive the war. From 1942 he taught at Berkeley, where he built a leading centre of logic. He died in Berkeley in 1983.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages (Polish 1933, German 1935)
- On the Concept of Logical Consequence (1936)
- Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Sciences (1936)
- The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics (1944)
- A Decision Method for Elementary Algebra and Geometry (1948)
- Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (collected papers, 1956)
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