Work · Analytic Philosophy
The Conscious Mind
The hard problem and the zombie argument.
Introduction
Chalmers’s first book, published by Oxford University Press in 1996, develops the “hard problem” of consciousness he had presented at a conference in Tucson in 1994 and in a paper of 1995: why are physical processes accompanied by experience at all? The “easy” problems concern functions such as attention or the reporting of mental states. Chalmers argues that zombies – beings physically identical to us but without experience – are conceivable, so consciousness does not follow logically from the physical facts. He defends a “naturalistic dualism” in which experience is a basic feature of the world, tied to physical processes by psychophysical laws, and takes panpsychism seriously. The term “hard problem” has since become standard.
Connections
Builds on
- Naming and Necessity1972 · Saul Kripke
- What Is It Like to Be a Bat?1974 · Thomas Nagel
Criticizes
- Consciousness Explained1991 · Daniel Dennett
Appears in
- Journey ‘The Riddle of Consciousness’ · Stop 10 of 10
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