Dzieło · Filozofia analityczna
Świadomy umysł
Trudny problem i argument z zombie.
Wprowadzenie
Chalmers’s first book, published by Oxford University Press in 1996, develops the “hard problem” of consciousness he had presented at a conference in Tucson in 1994 and in a paper of 1995: why are physical processes accompanied by experience at all? The “easy” problems concern functions such as attention or the reporting of mental states. Chalmers argues that zombies – beings physically identical to us but without experience – are conceivable, so consciousness does not follow logically from the physical facts. He defends a “naturalistic dualism” in which experience is a basic feature of the world, tied to physical processes by psychophysical laws, and takes panpsychism seriously. The term “hard problem” has since become standard.
Powiązania
Nawiązuje do
- Nazywanie i konieczność1972 · Saul Kripke
- Jak to jest być nietoperzem?1974 · Thomas Nagel
Krytykuje
- Consciousness Explained (Świadomość wyjaśniona)1991 · Daniel Dennett
Pojawia się w
- Podróż „Zagadka świadomości” · Przystanek 10 z 10
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