作品 · 分析哲学
成为一只蝙蝠是什么样子?
经验的主观特性是物理主义无法把握的。
简介
A short journal article, published in The Philosophical Review in October 1974 and later collected in Nagel’s Mortal Questions (1979). Nagel chose bats because they find their way by echolocation, a sense unlike any of ours: we could know everything about a bat’s brain and still not know what it is like to be one. An organism has conscious experience, he proposes, if there is “something it is like” to be that organism. Nagel does not claim that physicalism – the thesis that everything mental is physical – is false, only that we have no concept of how it could be true. The article became a standard starting point for debates about qualia and the “explanatory gap”.
联系
被承接于
- 本然的观点(The View from Nowhere)1986 · 托马斯·内格尔
- 有意识的心灵1996 · 大卫·查尔默斯
被回应于
- 副现象的感受质1982 · 弗兰克·杰克逊
被批评于
- 意识的解释1991 · 丹尼尔·丹尼特
托马斯·内格尔 的更多作品
出现在
- 旅程 ‘意识之谜’ · 第 7 站,共 10 站
截至 2026年11月 · 改进本页 · Agora 是如何制作的