यू. टी. प्लेस
चेतना भी मस्तिष्क की एक प्रक्रिया निकल सकती है, जैसे बिजली कड़कना विद्युत निकला – निर्णय शब्दों के अर्थ नहीं, विज्ञान करता है।
पृष्ठभूमि
ब्रिटिश दार्शनिक और मनोवैज्ञानिक: “क्या चेतना एक मस्तिष्क-प्रक्रिया है?” (1956) ने तर्क दिया कि चेतना उसी तरह एक मस्तिष्क-प्रक्रिया हो सकती है जैसे बिजली कड़कना एक विद्युत-विसर्जन है – विज्ञान द्वारा पाया गया तादात्म्य, अर्थों के विश्लेषण से नहीं।
मुख्य विचार
- मन का तादात्म्य सिद्धांत
- “घटनात्मक भ्रांति”
- प्रवृत्तियों के लिए व्यवहारवाद का बचाव
प्रभाव
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया 1
जे. जे. सी. स्मार्ट
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया
Convinced by his Adelaide colleague Place, Smart defended the identity of sensations and brain processes and answered objections to Place’s thesis (‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, 1959). J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); U. T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology 47 (1956); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
जे. जे. सी. स्मार्ट › 1920–2012
आलोचना
जिनकी आलोचना की 1
गिल्बर्ट राइल जिनसे प्रभावित
जिनसे प्रभावित
Place, who studied at Oxford under Ryle’s influence, started from Ryle’s treatment of attention and noticing in ‘The Concept of Heed’ (1954), the preliminary to his identity thesis. U. T. Place, “The Concept of Heed”, British Journal of Psychology 45 (1954); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
जिनकी आलोचना की
Place accepted Ryle’s dispositional analysis of belief and intelligence but held that consciousness and sensations are inner brain processes (‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’, 1956). U. T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology 47 (1956), 44–50
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
गिल्बर्ट राइल › 1900–1976
कृतियाँ
यह थीसिस कि चेतना एक मस्तिष्क-प्रक्रिया है, एक उचित वैज्ञानिक परिकल्पना है, जिसे तार्किक आधार पर ख़ारिज नहीं किया जाना चाहिए।
मत
Place accepted much of Ryle’s behaviourism: beliefs, knowledge and intelligence are dispositions to behave. But in “The Concept of Heed” (1954) he argued that consciousness, sensation and mental imagery cannot be analysed in this way. “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” (1956) proposed instead that they are processes in the brain. The claim is not that “consciousness” means “brain process” – plainly it does not – but that the two may turn out to be the same thing, as a cloud turns out to be a mass of water droplets or lightning a motion of electric charges. Such an identity is a scientific hypothesis and cannot be ruled out by logic. Place also named the “phenomenological fallacy”: the mistake of supposing that when we describe our experience as green, there must be something green inside us, rather than describing it by reference to how things look in normal conditions. His paper, together with Herbert Feigl’s and Smart’s, started the mind–brain identity theory. In later life he defended B. F. Skinner’s radical behaviourism against Noam Chomsky.
जीवन और संदर्भ
Ullin Thomas Place was born in 1924 in Northallerton, Yorkshire, and educated at Rugby School. He won a scholarship to Corpus Christi College, Oxford, in 1942, but as a conscientious objector worked in the Friends’ Ambulance Unit from 1943 to 1946. He graduated in philosophy and psychology in 1949, strongly influenced by Gilbert Ryle, and took a diploma in anthropology. From 1951 he lectured in psychology at the University of Adelaide, where the philosophy department was headed by J. J. C. Smart. He left Adelaide at the beginning of 1955, worked for many years as a clinical psychologist in Britain and later taught philosophy and psychology, mainly at the University of Leeds. He died in Thirsk in 2000 and left his brain to the University of Adelaide.
अन्य प्रमुख कृतियाँ
- The Concept of Heed (1954)
- Is Consciousness a Brain Process? (1956)
- Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers (2004)
- Dispositions: A Debate (with D. M. Armstrong and C. B. Martin, 1996)
इनमें आता है
- बहस ‘चेतना क्या है?’
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