Epiphenomenal Qualia (Epifenomenalne qualia)

Wprowadzenie

Frank Jackson, an Australian philosopher, published the paper in The Philosophical Quarterly in 1982. Besides Mary, the scientist who knows every physical fact about colour vision but has lived in a black-and-white room, it presents Fred, who can distinguish two colours where everyone else sees a single red. Both cases support the “knowledge argument”: physicalism says that all information is physical, but Mary learns something new when she first sees colour. Jackson concludes that there are qualia, the felt qualities of experience, and that they are epiphenomenal – caused by physical processes but without physical effects. In the late 1990s he abandoned the argument and became a physicalist; replies include David Lewis’s and Laurence Nemirow’s ability hypothesis.

Powiązania

Odpowiada na

• Jak to jest być nietoperzem?1974 · Thomas Nagel

Więcej dzieł: Frank Jackson

• 1998From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (Od metafizyki do etyki: obrona analizy pojęciowej)