Work · Analytic Philosophy
The Language of Morals
Moral judgments as universalizable prescriptions.
Introduction
Hare’s first book appeared in 1952, when emotivism – the view that moral language mainly expresses and influences feelings – dominated analytic ethics. Hare agreed that moral judgements are not statements of fact but held that they are not mere persuasion either. Like imperatives, they guide action, and they stand in logical relations to one another. Using examples such as “a good strawberry” or “a good motor car”, he distinguishes the descriptive from the evaluative meaning of “good”: the criteria vary, but the commendation stays the same. He argues that moral words are also universalisable, a point he developed fully in Freedom and Reason (1963).
Connections
Criticizes
- Language, Truth and Logic1936 · A. J. Ayer
Taken up in
- Practical Ethics1979 · Peter Singer
Criticized in
- The Sovereignty of Good1970 · Iris Murdoch
- Natural Goodness2001 · Philippa Foot
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