AgoraAn open square of thought

Debate

What Is Gender?

That bodies differ by sex, and that the roles attached to sex differ from one society to another, is undisputed. Disputed is what makes someone a woman or a man – the body, a social position, what one does or how one understands oneself – and which of these should count where: in law, in sport, in single-sex spaces.

Since the mid-twentieth century, many philosophers have distinguished sex, usually understood as bodily characteristics, from gender, the social meanings, roles and norms attached to them – though where and whether to draw that line is itself disputed. The question has become politically pressing as courts, parliaments, schools and sports bodies decide how to recognise trans and nonbinary people, whose lives and self-understanding have moved to the centre of philosophical work. Within feminist and trans philosophy, most theorists agree that gender is socially shaped but disagree about what exactly it is and what follows for politics. A prominent public and academic dispute concerns gender-critical views, which hold that “woman” means adult human female (see the last position below).

Open in the star map

Positions

One becomes a woman

Beauvoir’s “The Second Sex” (1949) argues that “one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman”: what it means to be a woman is not fixed by nature but formed by upbringing, myth and economic dependence, in a world where man is the norm and woman the “Other”. Bodily differences are real, but their meaning is lived within a social situation. This prepared later distinctions between sex and gender, although Beauvoir herself did not use those terms. Genevieve Lloyd (The Man of Reason, 1984) objects that the ideal of transcendence by which Beauvoir measures freedom comes from a philosophical tradition that defined it against everything it associated with women.

Held by

Gender as performative

Butler argues that gender is not an inner essence that behaviour expresses, but is produced through the repeated performance of acts that cite social norms – “performative” in the sense that the doing constitutes what it seems to express. This does not mean gender is freely chosen like a costume: the norms precede and constrain each of us. Butler also questions whether sex is simply natural, since even our understanding of bodies is shaped by these norms – which opens room to resist and rework them. Martha Nussbaum (“The Professor of Parody”, 1999) objects that the theory is obscure and that a politics of subversive parody offers little guidance for concrete legal and political reform.

Held by

Gender as social position

Haslanger proposes an “ameliorative” analysis: instead of asking only what we ordinarily mean by “woman”, ask which concept best serves the struggle against injustice. She defines gender as a hierarchical social position – to be a woman is to be systematically subordinated in some respect because one is perceived to have bodily features associated with a female role in reproduction. Katharine Jenkins (“Amelioration and Inclusion”, 2016), who shares Haslanger’s aims, objects that the definition excludes many trans women, namely those not perceived as female, although a concept meant to serve justice should include them.

Held by

Starting from trans lives

Bettcher argues that philosophy should start from trans people’s own lives and communities rather than treating them as puzzle cases for theories built elsewhere. She criticises both the “wrong body” model and the everyday practices that treat trans people’s genders as illusion or deception, and argues that words like “woman” have more than one meaning: in trans communities, “woman” is used in ways that include trans women as a matter of course. She also defends a form of first-person authority – an ethical standing to avow one’s own gender that others ought to respect. Alex Byrne (“Are Women Adult Human Females?”, 2020) doubts that such a separate community meaning exists and objects that the philosophical debate concerns the dominant, everyday meaning of the word.

Held by

Beyond the binary

Dembroff argues that the metaphysics of gender has focused almost entirely on women and men, leaving nonbinary and genderqueer people without conceptual tools. They introduce “critical gender kinds”: groups whose members collectively destabilise parts of dominant gender ideology – genderqueer people, for instance, challenge the assumption that there are exactly two exclusive genders. Gender kinds, on this view, can be defined not only by bodies or social positions but by how their members collectively relate to dominant norms. Alex Byrne (“Gender Muddle”, 2021), replying to Dembroff, objects that “woman” and “genderqueer” do not form one class of gender terms: the first names a biological category, the second a social one.

Held by

Woman as adult human female (gender-critical)

Gender-critical philosophers such as Alex Byrne (“Are Women Adult Human Females?”, 2020), Kathleen Stock (Material Girls, 2021) and Holly Lawford-Smith (Gender-Critical Feminism, 2022) hold that “woman” means adult human female – a category fixed by sex, not by gender identity or social role. Gender identity, insofar as they accept the notion, does not change a person’s sex, and in some contexts – single-sex spaces, sport, medicine, data collection – sex-based categories should take precedence. They combine this with support for protecting trans people from discrimination. Talia Mae Bettcher (“Trans Women and the Meaning of ‘Woman’”, 2013) and Robin Dembroff (“Escaping the Natural Attitude About Gender”, 2021) object that this misdescribes how gender terms are used: in trans communities, and also in law, policy and the media, “woman” often does not mean adult human female.

Read more

As of 10/2026. Summaries for orientation – the sources give the full arguments. · How Agora is made

Open in the star map