Nazywanie i konieczność

Wprowadzenie

Three lectures that Kripke gave without a written text at Princeton in January 1970; transcribed, they appeared in 1972 in the anthology Semantics of Natural Language and in 1980 as a book with a new preface. Kripke argues against the description theory of Frege and Russell: a name is not an abbreviated description but refers directly, its reference fixed by an initial “baptism” and passed on through a causal chain of use. He separates necessity, a metaphysical notion, from a priori knowledge, an epistemological one: “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is necessary but was discovered empirically. The same reasoning applies to natural kinds such as water or gold. The lectures helped restore metaphysics to a central place in analytic philosophy.

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Krytykuje

• Sens i nominat1892 · Gottlob Frege
• Denotowanie (On Denoting)1905 · Bertrand Russell

Podjęte w

• Świadomy umysł1996 · David Chalmers

Krytykowane w

• On the Plurality of Worlds (O wielości światów)1986 · David Lewis

Więcej dzieł: Saul Kripke

• 1982Wittgenstein o regułach i języku prywatnym