证伪与科学研究纲领方法论

简介

Lakatos presented an early version at the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science in London in 1965 and published the expanded paper in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970), which he edited with Alan Musgrave and which also contains contributions by Kuhn, Popper and Feyerabend. He criticises naive falsificationism – scientists rarely abandon a theory because of a single anomaly – but also Kuhn, in whose account, he says, theory change becomes a matter of “mob psychology”. The unit of appraisal is a research programme: a hard core shielded by a negative heuristic, a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses and a positive heuristic that guides research. A programme is progressive if it predicts novel facts, degenerating if it only accommodates them afterwards.

联系

回应了

• 科学革命的结构1962 · 托马斯·S. 库恩

批评了

• 科学发现的逻辑1934 · 卡尔·波普尔

伊姆雷·拉卡托斯 的更多作品

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