夸梅·吉耶基

Agora

夸梅·吉耶基

1939–2019

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

一个人由共同体所塑造，但并未被它吞没——非洲思想可以把共同体的价值与个人权利结合在一起。

定位

非洲与非洲裔哲学 · 形而上学, 伦理学, 社会与历史

加纳哲学家：重构了阿肯人的概念图式，并主张一种为个人权利留有余地的“温和社群主义”。

核心思想

阿肯人的概念图式
温和社群主义
人格

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影响

受影响于 1

亚里士多德

受其影响
Gyekye, trained in Greek and Arabic philosophy, translated Ibn al-Tayyib’s commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, the gateway to Aristotle’s logic (Arabic Logic, 1979). K. Gyekye (trans.), Arabic Logic: Ibn al-Tayyib’s Commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge (1979); An Essay on African Philosophical Thought (1987)
依据: AI 草稿
亚里士多德 › 公元前384—前322年

批评

批评了 4

约翰·S. 姆比蒂

批评了
Gyekye read Mbiti’s ‘I am, because we are’ as radical communitarianism without room for individual rights, and proposed a moderate version (‘Person and Community in African Thought’, 1992). K. Gyekye, “Person and Community in African Thought”, in K. Wiredu & K. Gyekye (eds.), Person and Community (1992); Tradition and Modernity (1997), ch. 2; J. S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (1969)
依据: AI 草稿
约翰·S. 姆比蒂 › 1931–2019
夸西·维雷杜受其影响

受其影响
Gyekye shared Wiredu’s programme of critically analysing Akan concepts and co-edited with him Person and Community (1992), while disputing his reading of the okra. K. Wiredu and K. Gyekye (eds.), Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies I (1992); K. Gyekye, An Essay on African Philosophical Thought (1987)
依据: AI 草稿
批评了
Against Wiredu’s quasi-physical reading of the Akan okra, Gyekye held the Akan person to be dualistic, with an immaterial soul (An Essay on African Philosophical Thought, 1987). K. Gyekye, An Essay on African Philosophical Thought (1987), ch. 6; K. Wiredu, “The Akan Concept of Mind”, Ibadan Journal of Humanistic Studies 3 (1983)
依据: AI 草稿
夸西·维雷杜 › 1931–2022
伊凡约·门基蒂

批评了
Gyekye objected that Menkiti’s ‘radical’ communitarianism, with personhood acquired in community, leaves no room for individual rights or criticism (‘Person and Community in African Thought’, 1992). K. Gyekye, “Person and Community in African Thought” (1992); Tradition and Modernity (1997), ch. 2; I. Menkiti, “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought” (1984)
依据: AI 草稿
伊凡约·门基蒂 › 1940–2019
保兰·洪通吉

批评了
Gyekye objected to Hountondji that traditional African thought, though unwritten and anonymous, goes back to individual thinkers and can be philosophy (An Essay on African Philosophical Thought, 1987). K. Gyekye, An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme (1987); P. Hountondji, Sur la « philosophie africaine » (1976)
依据: AI 草稿
保兰·洪通吉 › 1942–2024

作品

1987论非洲哲学思想：阿肯人的概念框架
阿肯人关于上帝、人、命运和共同体的观念，被重构为哲学。

立场

Gyekye wanted to show that the thought of the Akan of Ghana forms a coherent philosophical system, not just a collection of customs. In his main work he reconstructed Akan views of God, the person, destiny, evil and community, and argued that individual sages, not just the anonymous collective, contributed to it. Against radical communitarian readings of African thought, including some of his colleagues’, he defended a “moderate communitarianism”: the person is deeply shaped by the community, yet retains rights, a will of their own and the capacity to question tradition. Later he applied these ideas to the challenges of modernizing African societies.

生平与背景

Gyekye was born in the Gold Coast in 1939 and studied at the University of Ghana and then at Harvard, where he earned his doctorate with a study of Greek and Arabic logic. He taught for decades at the University of Ghana and also as a visiting professor in the United States, including at Temple University in Philadelphia. He died in 2019.