AgoraOtwarty plac myśli

Arkezylaos

ok. 316–241 p.n.e.

Pierwsze przybliżeniecelowe uproszczenie – portret mówi więcej

Na każdy argument istnieje równie mocny argument przeciw, więc powinniśmy zawiesić sąd we wszystkim – a mimo to możemy działać według tego, co wydaje się rozsądne.

Umiejscowienie

Filozofia hellenistyczna, rzymska i późnoantyczna · Azja Zachodnia i Afryka Północna · Epistemologia

Scholarcha Akademii od około 268 roku p.n.e., który zwrócił szkołę Platona ku sceptycyzmowi: jak Sokrates argumentował przeciw każdemu stanowisku, przede wszystkim przeciw stoickiemu twierdzeniu, że niektóre wrażenia nie mogą być fałszywe, i zalecał zawieszenie sądu we wszystkim.

Kluczowe idee

  • Zawieszenie sądu (epoche) we wszystkim
  • Krytyka stoickiego wrażenia poznawczego
  • Sokratejski argument przeciw każdemu poglądowi
  • To, co rozsądne (eulogon), jako przewodnik działania

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Wpływ

Pod wpływem 3

  • Sokrates

    pod wpływem

    Arcesilaus appealed to Socrates’ avowal of knowing nothing and radicalised it: not even this can be known, so he withheld assent on everything (Cicero, Academica I.45). Cicero, Academica I.44–45; SEP “Arcesilaus”

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Sokrates › 470–399 p.n.e.

  • Platon

    pod wpływem

    Arcesilaus presented his scepticism as a return to the questioning Plato of the dialogues, arguing against every view so that equal reasons lead to suspending assent. Cicero, Academica I.44–46; De oratore III.67; SEP “Arcesilaus”

    Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO

    Platon › 428–348 p.n.e.

  • Pyrron z Elidy

    pod wpływem sporne

    The Stoic Ariston mocked Arcesilaus as ‘Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle’; how much his suspension of judgement owed to Pyrrho is disputed. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.234; Diogenes Laertius IV.33; SEP “Arcesilaus”

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Pyrron z Elidy › ok. 360–270 p.n.e.

Wpływ na 2

  • Karneades z Cyreny

    wpływ na

    Carneades took up Arcesilaus’ arguments against the Stoic criterion of truth and sharpened them against Chrysippus’ refined version; he too argued on both sides of a question. Cicero, Academica II; Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians I.159–189; SEP “Carneades”

    Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO

    Karneades z Cyreny › ok. 214–129 p.n.e.

  • Cyceron

    wpływ na

    Cicero adopted the Academic method Arcesilaus had introduced – arguing against every view and withholding firm assent – and defended it in his Academica (45 BCE). Cicero, Academica I.43–46, II; SEP “Arcesilaus”; SEP “Cicero”

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Cyceron › 106–43 p.n.e.

Krytyka

Krytyka ze strony 1

  • Augustyn z Hippony

    krytyka ze strony

    In Contra Academicos (386) Augustine argued against the Academic scepticism begun by Arcesilaus that the wise must know truth and that some truths are certain. Augustine, Contra Academicos III.10.23–13.29; SEP “Augustine”

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Augustyn z Hippony › 354–430

Krytykuje 1

  • Zenon z Kition

    krytykuje

    Arcesilaus denied Zeno’s ‘kataleptic’ impression, since a false impression could always look the same, and concluded that the wise should suspend assent. Cicero, Academica II.77; Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos VII.150–158; SEP “Arcesilaus”

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Zenon z Kition › ok. 334–262 p.n.e.

Stanowisko

Arcesilaus began what later writers called the Middle or New Academy. He presented his scepticism as a return to Socrates, who claimed to know only that he knew nothing, and to the questioning Plato of the dialogues: instead of stating his own view he argued against whatever his listeners proposed, so that, as Cicero puts it, equal weight of reasons on both sides would lead them to withhold assent. His main target was the Stoic theory of knowledge of Zeno of Citium. Zeno held that there are “cognitive impressions” (phantasiai katalēptikai) which come from what is and are stamped in such a way that they could not come from what is not, and that the wise person assents only to these. Arcesilaus replied that for every true impression there could be a false one indistinguishable from it – twins, eggs, dreams, madness. If so, no impression is cognitive, and the wise person, who never holds mere opinions, must suspend judgement (epochē) on everything. To the objection that this makes action impossible he answered, according to Sextus, that one can act on what is “reasonable” (eulogon). Whether he held these views himself or only drew out consequences of Stoic premises is debated. The Stoic Ariston mocked him as “Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle”, and how much he owed to Pyrrho is still an open question. Carneades carried his method further; Cicero wrote within this Academic tradition, and Augustine argued against it.

Życie i kontekst

Arcesilaus was born around 316/315 BCE in Pitane in Aeolis, on the coast of Asia Minor. After studying mathematics he came to Athens, where he first heard Theophrastus, Aristotle’s successor in the Lyceum, and then joined Plato’s Academy under Polemo and Crantor. Around 268–264 BCE, on the death of Crates of Athens (not the Cynic Crates of Thebes), he became head of the Academy. Diogenes Laertius (IV 28–45) describes a witty, generous teacher with a large following. He wrote nothing; his arguments are known from Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius. He died around 241/240 BCE at the age of 75.

Główne dzieła

  • No writings (Arcesilaus taught only orally; Diogenes Laertius mentions a few poems and letters)

Źródła: Wikipedia · Wikidata

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