الشخص والجماعة في الفكر الأفريقي التقليدي (Person and Community in African Traditional Thought)

مقدمة

Menkiti’s essay appeared in Richard A. Wright’s anthology African Philosophy: An Introduction and is usually cited from its third edition of 1984. It contrasts what Menkiti calls the Western view, which defines a person by features such as rationality or memory that an individual possesses alone, with an African view in which the community comes first. He argues that personhood is attained through ritual incorporation and the fulfilment of obligations; children are not yet persons in the full sense, elders are more fully persons, and the recently dead remain persons for a time. Kwame Gyekye objected that this “radical” communitarianism leaves no room for individual rights, and the essay became the starting point of a long debate on personhood in African philosophy.

الصلات

يستند إلى

• الأديان الأفريقية والفلسفة (African Religions and Philosophy)1969 · جون مبيتي