作品 · 现象学与诠释学
从经验立场看的心理学
意向性是心理之物的标志。
简介
Brentano published this first volume in 1874, the year he moved from Würzburg to Vienna; of six planned books only two appeared. He wants to make psychology a science grounded in inner perception, which, unlike deliberate inner observation, accompanies every mental act. The famous passage in Book II defines mental phenomena by the “intentional inexistence” of an object: each contains something as its object, though not always in the same way. On this basis Brentano divides mental acts into presentations, judgements and phenomena of love and hate. Through Husserl, Meinong and Twardowski the concept of intentionality entered phenomenology and later analytic philosophy of mind.
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- 论灵魂(De anima)约公元前350年年 · 亚里士多德
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