Dzieło · Filozofia analityczna
O treści i przedmiocie przedstawień
Odróżnia czynność, treść i przedmiot przedstawienia: nawet „okrągły kwadrat” ma treść, ale jego przedmiot nie istnieje.
Wprowadzenie
Twardowski submitted this study in Vienna in 1894 as his habilitation thesis; it was published the same year. Starting from Brentano’s thesis that every mental act is directed at an object, it distinguishes three elements of a presentation: the act, its content and its object. The content is the mental image through which something is presented; the object is what is presented, whether it exists or not. Even “a round square” has an object, which is presented but does not exist, and general presentations have general objects. The book was widely discussed: Meinong developed his theory of objects on related ground, and Husserl wrote a reply, “Intentional Objects”, which remained unpublished in his lifetime. It is now regarded as a link between Brentano’s school, phenomenology and early analytic philosophy.
Powiązania
Nawiązuje do
- Psychologia z empirycznego punktu widzenia1874 · Franz Brentano
Podjęte w
- Über Gegenstandstheorie (O teorii przedmiotów)1904 · Alexius Meinong
Więcej dzieł: Kazimierz Twardowski
Stan na listopad 2026 · Ulepsz tę stronę · Jak powstaje Agora