On the Plurality of Worlds

Introduction

Based on Lewis’s John Locke Lectures at Oxford in 1984 and published in 1986, the book is the fullest defence of “modal realism”. For Lewis, talk of what is possible or necessary is talk about possible worlds, and these worlds are concrete and just as real as ours; “actual” simply means “this one”, the world we inhabit. The theory, he argues, earns its keep by explaining modality, properties, propositions and counterfactuals within one framework. Since no individual exists in more than one world, a person can only have counterparts in other worlds. Much of the book answers objections, including what Lewis called the “incredulous stare” with which most readers greet the view.

Connections

Builds on

• Monadology1714 · Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

Criticizes

• Naming and Necessity1972 · Saul Kripke