Work · Analytic Philosophy
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
Falsifiability instead of verification – a solution to the problem of induction?
Introduction
Popper, then a schoolteacher in Vienna, condensed a much longer manuscript into this book; it appeared in late 1934, dated 1935, in a series edited by Moritz Schlick and Philipp Frank. Against the Vienna Circle he argues that verification cannot be the mark of science, since no number of observations proves a general law. A theory is scientific if it can in principle be refuted by observation; the more it forbids, the more it says. Popper replaces inductive logic with a method of bold conjectures and severe tests, and discusses probability and quantum mechanics at length. An expanded English version, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, followed in 1959.
Connections
Responds to
- An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding1748 · David Hume
Criticizes
- The Logical Structure of the World1928 · Rudolf Carnap
Criticized in
- The Structure of Scientific Revolutions1962 · Thomas S. Kuhn
- Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes1970 · Imre Lakatos
- Against Method1975 · Paul Feyerabend
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